TO: ALL SHIPOWNERS, YACHT OWNERS, OPERATORS, MASTERS AND OFFICERS OF MERCHANT SHIPS, AND RECOGNIZED ORGANIZATIONS


References:
(a) International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code (MI Marine Notice 2-011-16)
(b) International Safety Management (ISM) Code (MI Marine Notice 2-011-13)
(d) International Maritime Organization (IMO) MSC.1/Circ.1337, dated 4 August 2010
(e) IMO Resolution A.683(17), dated 6 November 1991
(f) IMO Resolution MSC. 305(87), dated 17 May 2010
(g) MSC/Circ. 805, dated 6 June 1997
(h) Post-Piracy Care for Seafarers Guidelines, Seaman’s Church Institute, Version 3.0, 1 August 2011.
(i) MSC.1/Circ.1404, Guidelines to Assist in the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 23 May 2011
(k) MG-2-11-12, Guidance for Company Security Officers on Preparing a Company and Crew for the Contingency of a Hijacking by Pirates (Western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden)
(l) Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for Protection Against Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Region, dated 21 December 2012

PURPOSE:

This Notice requires Ship Security Plans (SSPs) pursuant to the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code to include security measures to protect against incidents of piracy, armed attacks (including armed robbery), hijacking or terrorism that at a minimum meet internationally accepted Best Management Practices (BMP) and Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) requirements. It also requires the reporting of all such incidents to the RMI Maritime Administrator (the “Administrator”) and authorities.
It is important to note that the Administrator considers the ISPS Code to be an extension of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code under “Emergency Preparedness.” The ISM Code was amended to require companies to assess all identified risks to their vessels, personnel and the environment and to establish appropriate safeguards. These risks include the threat of piracy, armed attacks, hijacking and terrorism, particularly for vessels operating in High Risk Areas as defined in Annex A.

The Administrator strongly endorses and recommends that ships subscribe to Ship Security Reporting System (SSRS). This system provides a real-time link between ship operations and naval operations by enhancing the counter-piracy effectiveness of the existing Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) (see REQUIREMENTS section 2.2.1.b, below).

This Notice supersedes Rev 10/12 and reflects a reference to the new Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators and Masters for Protection Against Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea Region, dated 21 December 2012 (reference (I) above) and the incorporation of a medical exam requirement (paragraph 15.2) for seafarers that have been subject to a situation involving robbery, hostage taking or piracy aboard a vessel.

APPLICABILITY:

1.0 SSP and BMP Requirements

1.1 In addition to adhering to the reporting requirements, the following RMI flagged vessels that are subject to the ISPS Code and operate in High Risk Areas shall comply with the SSP and BMP provisions of this Notice:

- Passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft;
- Cargo ships, including high-speed craft, of 500 gross tonnage (ITC 69) and upwards;
- Special Purpose Ships of 500 gross tonnage; and
- Self-propelled mobile offshore drilling units capable of making international voyages unassisted and unescorted when underway and not on location.

1.2 Yachts shall comply with the BMP provided in Section 16 of this Notice.

2.0 Reporting Requirements

All ships, including yachts, under the RMI flag must comply with all reporting requirements.

REQUIREMENTS:

1.0 SSP – Risk Assessment

1.1 MI shipowners and operators with vessels identified in section 1.1, above, must, along with the Master, carry out a risk assessment of their vessel(s) to determine the likelihood and consequences of a piracy attack, an armed attack, hijacking or terrorism and identify and incorporate prevention, mitigation and recovery measures in their SSPs, taking into consideration the guidance contained in MSC.1/Circ.1337, along with the BMP Guidelines (see Annex A) and additional Administrator-specific measures, including
those pertaining to radio and distress messages, contained in Annex A of this Notice, each as may be updated or amended.

1.2 Incorporation of relevant provisions on piracy, armed robbery, terrorism and armed attack into SSPs is required immediately, but need not be verified and approved until the next scheduled ISM/ISPS Code Audit. As outlined in §10.3.3 of RMI Marine Notice 2-011-16, the provisions can be included as an Annex to the SSP to facilitate the anticipated updates to the BMP and guidance on post-piracy care for seafarers.

2.0 Reporting

2.1 General

The Administrator recognizes that an essential part of preventing, deterring and suppressing attacks is prompt reporting to the proper authorities and organizations both during and post-incident. As a result, not only must reporting be addressed by Companies and ships as part of their BMP in accordance with IMO Resolution A.683(17), Prevention and Suppression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, the Administrator is required to report in detail all incidents of piracy and armed robbery of its vessels to the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

2.2 Initial Notification and Reporting

.1 Suez, Gulf of Aden (GoA), the Somali Basin Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean

.a Pre-Transit Registration and Notification

Ships must participate in the pre-transit registration and notification requirements outlined in section 5.1.4 and 5.1.5 of the BMP (see Annex A of this Notice) for each transit made. All ships transiting the Red Sea, GoA, the Somali Basin, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea and Western Indian Ocean are being tracked and monitored through Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) by EUNAVFOR. The shipowners of those ships reported to the Administrator by EUNAVFOR found not to be registered with MSCHOA or reporting to the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) will be contacted by the Administrator and reminded to bring their ships into compliance.

.b Ship Security Alert System (SSAS)

.i The following ships are required to comply with SOLAS Regulation XI-2/6 for a SSAS:

- passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft;
- cargo ships, including high-speed craft, of 500 gross tons and above; and
- mechanically propelled mobile offshore drilling units as defined in SOLAS regulation IX/1, not on location and on location in piracy High Risk Areas. See RMI Marine Notice 2-011-18.
ii If attacked by pirates, or there is a clear and imminent threat of danger, a ship should immediately activate its SSAS. This will alert the Company Security Officer (CSO) and the Administrator. Additionally, if the ship is subscribed to SSRS (see .c, below), it will also directly alert naval/military forces. If a ship has not subscribed to SSRS, UKMTO should be notified after SSAS activation.

iii The transmission of a Ship Security Alert (SSA) should not be included with any other routine reporting that the ship may conduct. The message transmission should be generated automatically with no input from the operator other than the activation of the system. Remember that two (2) activation points are required: one (1) located on the navigation bridge and one (1) other that would normally be accessible. The second activation point should be kept confidential, known only to the Master, Ship Security Officer (SSO) and other senior ship’s personnel as may be decided by the CSO.

iv The SSA message must be capable of reaching the Administrator and CSO from any point along the vessel’s intended route and must include:

- the vessel name;
- the IMO Ship Identification Number;
- the Call Sign;
- the Maritime Mobile Service Identity;
- date and time;
- position;
- course and speed;
- name of CSO and 24/7 phone number;
- name of alternate CSO and 24/7 phone number; and
- a message stating that the SSAS has been activated and indicating the ship is under threat or it has been compromised.

c Ship Security Reporting System (SSRS)

i Shipowners are authorized and strongly recommended to subscribe to the SSRS because it provides a real-time link between ship operations and naval/military operations by enhancing the counter-piracy effectiveness of the existing SSAS.

ii The SSRS is provided through a commercial service that continuously monitors SSAS alerts and ship position reports, filters out alerts emanating from outside the High Risk Area and depending upon the location of the report, routes the information in real time to participating Naval Operations Centres. Shipowners receive a notification email confirming that security alert/position report information is being routed to a Naval Operations Centre.
.iii The SSRS enables a rapid, coordinated response to a security alert by automating alert transmissions and connecting ships directly to Task Forces (via the relevant Naval Operations Centres). It minimizes communication delays between the stakeholders. Naval/military forces are provided with immediate knowledge of the location of a piracy attack, pre/post attack ship positional information, and relevant ship-specific information such as freeboard, speed and communication terminal details.

.iv Should crew members be under immediate duress, the SSRS offers a covert method of automatically alerting naval/military forces and is particularly effective in triggering a speedy response when used in conjunction with a telephone call to UKMTO. Note that once activated, it will automatically continue to report to the military authorities until deactivated.

.v Be prepared to immediately verify SSRS activation with the UKMTO.

.vi The SSRS service can be accessed from the commercial website: www.ssrs.org.

2 Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Gulf

When transiting the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman and Arabian Gulf, as soon as the Master feels that a threat is developing, he/she should immediately activate the SSAS and call to report hostile or potentially hostile action (including suspicious activity) to the COMUSNAVCENT Battlewatch Captain and UKMTO (see Appendix I for contact details).

3 Other High Risk Areas (see Annex A, 1.4)

When transiting these areas, as soon as the Master feels that a threat is developing, he/she should immediately activate the SSAS to alert the Company Security Officer and Administrator and call to report hostile or potentially hostile action (including suspicious activity) to the local authorities, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and/or International Maritime Bureau (IMB) (see Appendix I for contact details) depending on ship location.

2.3 Follow-up Reporting of Incident

.1 Masters, owners or operators must immediately (within 24 hours) report by fax or email the occurrence of all incidents of piracy and armed robbery, armed attacks, attempted or actual hijacking, terrorism or other hostile or suspicious activity, including apparent surveillance being conducted by small vessels, on or near their vessels to:

    Republic of the Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator
    c/o Investigations
    11495 Commerce Park Drive
    Reston, Virginia 20191-1506 USA
The report should be submitted to the Administrator on form MI-109-2, Report of Piracy and/or Armed Robbery Against Vessels, contained in Appendix III of this Notice.

Reports received by the Administrator will be transmitted to:

- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), Bethesda, MD, USA;
- IMO, Maritime Safety Department, London;
- IMB, Essex, UK; and
- The International Shipping Federation, London.

The MI-109-2 form also may be used for submissions to the international organizations (e.g., Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), UKMTO, Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO), IMB and IMO). BMP dictate that post incident reports be filled out by the Master and forwarded to the Administrator for further forwarding to UKMTO and MSCHOA.

Refer to Appendix I of this Notice for all contact details of the naval/military forces and IMB.

2.4. Reporting Acts of Violence Against Crew

The RMI is a signatory to the 3 August 2011 Declaration Condemning Acts of Violence Against Seafarers (the “Washington Declaration”). This Declaration recognizes that such acts of violence are largely underreported and that this information would be of value to the maritime community in the fight against piracy.

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of Commerce has undertaken to collect this information on violence against ships’ crews. As such, the IMB has developed a questionnaire (see Appendix VI). This questionnaire should be completed by MI-flag vessel owner/operators post-incident.

Importantly, the Declaration Condemning Acts of Violence Against Seafarers requires all reporting bodies or agencies to refrain from reporting or confirming the names of any vessel upon which an act of piracy or armed robbery has been committed, until such time as the vessel owners/operators can confirm notification to next of kin.
BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES GUIDELINES - ANNEX A

In an effort to counter piracy in the GoA, the Somali Basin, Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea, industry has developed and prepared the Best Management Practices (BMP) Guidelines which are supported and endorsed by the Administrator through the New York Declaration. The BMP Guidelines aim to assist Companies and ships in avoiding piracy attacks by providing suggested planning and recommended operational practices. The BMP Guidelines complement guidance provided in IMO’s MSC.1/Circ.1337 (reference (d), of this Notice). This Annex is a consolidation of the BMP and additional guidance provided by the Administrator through lessons learned. See Appendix VII for signatories to and updating of the BMP.

1.0 Definitions

1.1 Armed Robbery

1.1.1 Armed robbery against ships means any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea;

(b) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.

1.2 Piracy

1.2.1 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

As contained in Article 101 of UNCLOS and as amended consistent with the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

i. on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

ii. against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; or

(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b) above.
.2 BMP Guidance on Definition of Piracy

To provide a clear, practical, working definition, BMP provide the following as guidance for determining whether an attack is piracy:

(a) the use of violence against the ship or its personnel or any attempt to use violence;

(b) attempt(s) to board the vessel where the Master suspects persons are pirates;

(c) an actual boarding whether successful in gaining control of the vessel or not; or

(d) attempts to overcome the ship’s protective measures by the use of:
   - ladders
   - grappling hooks
   - weapons deliberately used against or at the vessel.

1.3 Suspicious Activity

.1 Action taken by another craft may be deemed suspicious if any of the following occur (the list is not exhaustive and should be treated as guidance):

(a) a definite course alternation towards the craft associated with a rapid increase in speed, by the suspected craft, which cannot be accounted for a normal activity in the circumstances prevailing in the area;

(b) small craft sailing on the same course and speed for an uncommon period and distance, not in keeping with normal fishing or other circumstances prevailing in the area;

(c) sudden changes in course toward the vessel and aggressive behavior.

.2 In helping to evaluate suspicious activity, the following may be of assistance to determine the nature of a suspect vessel:

(a) the number of crew on board relative to its size;

(b) the Closest Point of Approach (CPA);

(c) the existence of unusual and non-fishing equipment (e.g., ladders, climbing hooks or large amounts of fuel onboard);

(d) if the craft is armed in excess of the level commonly experienced in the area;

(e) if weapons are fired in the air.
1.4 High Risk Areas

“High Risk Areas” are “areas of the ocean where acts of terrorism, piracy or armed robbery have taken place.” An area defined as High Risk may change periodically or over time due to changes in weather, tactics and areas of operation of the perpetrators. Therefore, it is imperative that owners, operators and Masters assess areas of risk based on the latest available information from the MSCHOA, NATO Shipping Centre (NSC) and International Maritime Bureau (IMB). Vessels also must be prepared to alter course at short notice to avoid pirate activity when information is provided by NAV Warnings and/or naval/military forces.

.1 BMP High Risk Area

(a) Somalia, the North West Indian Ocean and GoA: The High Risk Area contained in the BMP Guidelines is defined as an area bounded by Suez, the Strait of Hormuz to the North (26ºN), 10ºS and 78ºE. (Note: the UKMTO voluntary Reporting Area is slightly larger as it includes the Arabian Gulf). Attacks have taken place at most extremities of the HRA, including at 78º E. The possibility remains that they could take place further out. Attacks to the South have extended into the Mozambique Channel and below 10ºS. A high state of readiness and vigilance should be maintained even to the South of the Southerly limit of the High Risk Area. Therefore, the Administrator has extended the limits of the HRA to 15ºS and advises against using the Mozambique Channel altogether.

.2 Other High Risk Areas

(a) Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman: The Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman are considered a High Risk Area by the Administrator. It is highly recommended that all ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz exercise the highest level of vigilance and caution, particularly during night transits with increased monitoring of small vessel and boat activity. Ship Masters that observe suspicious activity in the area and around their vessel are advised to make as early an assessment of a threat as possible. See section 5.8, below.

(b) Waters Near Yemen: A piracy operating area has been established in the southern end of the Red Sea. In addition, information suggests that al-Qaida remains interested in maritime attacks in the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait, Red Sea and the GoA along the coast of Yemen. It should be noted that for reasons of customary international law, it is not possible for international military forces (non-Yemeni) to be able to protect ships that are attacked inside Yemeni Territorial Waters (12 miles).

(c) Indian Ocean: Recent attacks indicate that pirates are moving towards the eastern part of the Indian Ocean approaching closer to Indian west and south coast, Lakshadweep/Minicoy Islands, northern Maldives. There
have been reports indicating that pirates have and will continue to operate as far south as the Mozambique Channel and 15°S latitude. Vessels sailing in the western, central, eastern and northern parts of the Indian Ocean should maintain strict antipiracy measures.

(d) **South East Asia and South China Sea:** The situation in Southeast Asia has deteriorated recently. Although attacks at sea have increased, attacks in the region are mainly opportunistic petty theft from ships at anchor or in port. These occur in and around ports and anchorages in Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines. Pirates in these regions are normally armed with guns, knives and or machetes and attack at night. Attacks in the South China Sea continue, particularly in the vicinity of the Anambas, Natuna, Mangka Islands, Subi Besar and Merundung areas. Vessels sailing in the South East Asia and the South China Sea should maintain strict antipiracy measures, including maintaining a strict antipiracy watch when transiting the Malacca Straits.

(e) **West Africa:** Most recently, the United Nations voiced concern over the increase in piracy in this West African sub-region. Piracy, armed robbery, and reports of hostage-taking have dramatically increased in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). Such incidents have occurred in: Togo (Lome), Benin (Cotonou), Guinea (Conakry), Cameroon (Douala Outer Anchorage) and Nigeria (Lagos and Bonny River). These incidents in West Africa are different than those occurring off the Coast of Somalia and in the Indian Ocean. Somali pirates, to date, have sought to hijack a vessel, her cargo and crew and hold them until a ransom demand is paid. In contrast, the perpetrators in West Africa are more violent, often terrorizing and injuring the crews before robbing them and their ship of valuables and cargo.

Vessels transiting these areas are advised to take extra precautions and maintain the appropriate anti-piracy BMPs in reference (l). These Interim Guidelines have been developed by BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO, and are supported by the NATO Shipping Centre. A soft copy can be found on the websites of these organizations.

(f) **Latin America:** Increases in maritime criminal incidents, primarily armed theft, have been noted off the Pacific Coast of Latin America, particularly at the Peruvian port of Callao. Incidents of piracy (violent attacks resulting in death) off the coast of Venezuela are a serious concern especially for yachts. Yachts sailing in Venezuelan waters should exercise a heightened level of caution and implement appropriate BMP.

1.5 Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC)

.1 IMO SN.1/Circ.281 provides the details of the IRTC in the GoA. This corridor includes the creation of separate eastbound and westbound transit lanes. Each lane is 5 nm wide and is separated by a 2 nm buffer zone. The IRTC eastbound lane begins at 045° E between 11° 48’.00 N and 11°53’.00 N. The lane is
oriented along a straight line course of 072° and terminates at 053° E between 14°18’.00 N and 14°23’.00 N. The IRTC westbound lane begins at 053° between 14°25’.00 N and 14°30’.00 N. The lane is oriented along a straight line course of 252° and terminates at 045° E between 11°55’.00 N and 12°00’.00 N.

This IRTC is subject to change by military authorities according to prevailing circumstances. Shipowners, ship operators and Masters are urged to obtain up-to-date information from the MSCHOA website and NAV-warnings promulgated for that area.

1.6 UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA)

This is the area bounded by Suez to the North, Arabian Gulf, 10°S and 78°E. UKMTO acts as the primary point of contact for merchant vessels and liaison with military forces in the region. UKMTO is the primary point of contact during an attack. Vessels are strongly encouraged to send regular reports to UKMTO as follows:

- Initial Report;
- Daily Reports (at 08:00 GMT); and
- Final Report (upon departure from the high risk area or arrival in port).
- Upon port departure, resume the above cycle.

*Note: UKMTO is unable to receive directly and respond to an SSAS as a designated recipient when a vessel is outside the UKMTO Voluntary Reporting Area.*

1.7 Private Maritime Security Company (PMSC)

PMSCs are private contractors employed to provide private contracted security personnel, both armed and unarmed, on board for protection against piracy.

2.0 Typical Pirate Attacks

2.1 Commonly, two (2) high-speed (up to 25 knots) open boats/skiffs are used in attacks, often approaching from the starboard or port quarter and/or stern. Skiffs are frequently fitted with 2 outboard engines or a larger single 60hp engine.

2.2 Pirate Action Groups (PAG) operate in a number of different boat configurations. To date, whatever the configuration, the attack phase is carried out by skiffs. PAG boat configurations include:

- Skiffs only-usually two (2).
- Open whalers carrying significant quantities of fuel often towing two (2) or more attack skiffs.
- Motherships which have included the very largest of merchant ships, fishing vessels and dhows. These motherships have been taken by the pirates and usually have their own crew onboard as hostages. Motherships are used to carry pirates, stores, fuel and attack skiffs to enable pirates to operate over a much larger area and are significantly less affected by the weather. Attack skiffs are often towed behind motherships. Where the size of the mothership allows it, skiffs are increasingly being carried onboard and camouflaged to reduce chances of interdiction by naval/military forces.
- Attackers also have been known to try to blend in with local fishing boats, lie in wait in the IRTC or to disguise themselves as Coastguard, naval personnel, or pilots in order to board the ship. When a target ship nears, the attackers’ boats will break cover and approach the ship to allow the attackers to board the ship.

2.3 Increasingly, pirates use small arms fire and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) in an effort to intimate Masters of ships to reduce speed and stop to allow the pirates to board. The use of these weapons is generally focused on the bridge and accommodation area. In what are difficult circumstances, it is very important to maintain Full Sea Speed, increasing speed where possible, and using careful maneuvering to resist the attack.

2.4 Somali pirates seek to place their skiffs alongside the ship being attacked to enable one or more armed pirates to climb onboard. Pirates frequently use long lightweight leaders and ropes, or a long hooked pole with a knotted climbing rope to climb up the side of the vessel being attacked. Once alongside, one or more armed pirates climb onboard. Pirates frequently use long lightweight ladders or grappling irons hooked to the ship’s rail to climb up the sides of the vessel being attacked. Once onboard the pirate (or pirates) will generally make their way to the bridge to take control of the vessel. Once on the bridge the pirate/pirates will demand that the ship slows/stops to enable further pirates to board.

2.5 Attacks have taken place at most times of the day. However, many pirate attacks have taken place early in the morning, at first light. Attacks have occurred at night, particularly clear, moonlit nights, but nighttime attacks are less common.

2.6 The majority of attempted hijacks have been repelled by ship’s crew who have planned and trained in advance of the passage and applied BMP.

3.0 Implementing BMPs

3.1 Master’s Discretion

While recognizing the absolute discretion of the Master at all times to adopt appropriate measures to avoid, deter or delay piracy attacks in this region, the recommended BMP provide suggested planning and operational measures for shipowners, ship operators, Masters and their crews.

3.2 Fundamental BMP Requirements

.1 The three fundamental requirements of BMP are:

- Register at MSCHOA (See sections 4.2 and 5.1.4, below)
- Report to UKMTO (See section 5.1.5, below)
- Implement Ship Protection Measures (See section 7.0, below)

.2 The Administrator also recommends reporting to UKMTO as backup (see section 5.1.5.iii.c, below).
3.3 Risk Assessment and Factors to Consider

.1 Any decision to navigate in areas where the vessel’s security may be threatened requires careful consideration and detailed planning to best ensure the safety of the vessel and crew. Prior to transiting a High Risk Area, the owner and Master should carry out their own risk assessment to assess the likelihood and consequences of piracy attacks, armed attacks, hijackings or terrorism on the ship, based on the latest available information. Owners are highly recommended to utilize the Automated Voyage Risk Assessment (AVRA) services being offered by BIMCO which will generate an ISPS Code compliant specific threat assessment for the individual ship concerned. The outcome of this risk assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery and will mean combining statutory requirements with supplementary measures to combat piracy. Not all the BMP may be applicable for each ship. Therefore, as part of the risk analysis, an assessment should determine which of the BMP are most suitable for the ship and its specific voyage.

.2 Factors to be considered in the risk assessment should include, but are not limited to:

(a) Crew and Passenger Safety

- The primary consideration should be to ensure the safety of the crew and passengers. Care should be taken, when formulating measures to prevent illegal boarding and external access to the accommodation, that crew members will not be trapped inside and should be able to escape in the event of another type of emergency, such as for example, fire.
- Careful consideration should be given to the location of a Safe Muster Point or Citadel (See section 6.14, below).
- Consideration should also be given to the ballistic protection afforded to the crew who may be required to remain on the bridge during a pirate attack, recognizing that pirates increasingly fire at the bridge of a vessel to try to force it to stop.

(b) Freeboard

- It is likely that pirates will try to board the ship being attacked at the lowest point above the waterline, making it easier for them to climb onboard. These points are often on either quarter.
- Experience suggests that vessels with a minimum freeboard that is greater than eight (8) meters have a much greater chance of successfully escaping a piracy attempt than those with less.
- A large freeboard will provide little or no protection, if the construction of the ship provides assistance to pirates seeking to climb onboard. Should this be the case, further protective measures should be considered.
- A large freeboard alone may not be enough to deter a pirate attack.
(c) Speed

- One (1) of the most effective ways to defeat a pirate attack is by using speed to try to outrun the attackers and/or make it difficult to board.
- To date, there have been no reported attacks where pirates have boarded a ship that has been proceeding at over 18 knots. It is possible however that pirate tactics and techniques may develop to enable them to board faster moving ships.
- Ships are recommended to proceed at Full Sea Speed or at least 18 knots where they are capable of greater speed, throughout their transit of the High Risk Area. If a vessel is part of a Group Transit (GT) within the IRTC, speed may be required to be adjusted. It is important to note that even vessels of low speed have successfully evaded attack by not stopping under threat.
- Increase to maximum safe speed immediately and as quickly as possible after identifying any suspicious vessel in order to try to open the Closest Point of Approach (CPA) from any possible attackers and/or make the vessel more difficult to board.
- Reference should be made to the MSCHOA, NATO Shipping Centre and MARLO websites for the latest threat guidance regarding attack speed capability.

(d) Sea State

- Weather continues to be a primary factor determining when pirates will operate. Pirates mount their attacks from very small craft (skiffs), even where they are supported by larger vessels or “mother ships,” which tends to limit their operations to moderate sea states.
- It is likely to be more difficult to operate these small craft effectively in Sea State 3 and above.

(e) Pirate Activity: The risk of a piracy attack appears to increase immediately following the release of a hijacked vessel and/or following a period of poor weather when pirates have been unable to operate.

4.0 Company Planning

4.1 Prior to Entering High Risk Area

.1 Register Ship with MSCHOA

Ship operators should register for access to the restricted section of the MSCHOA website (www.MSCHOA.org) prior to entering the area bounded by 78°E, 10°S and 23°N and Suez. Registration with the MSCHOA website is required before a Vessel Movement Registration Form can be submitted as provided in section 4.2.1, below.
The Administrator recommends, however, that preparation for registration should begin as soon as the ship begins entering the HRA at the Suez Canal from the Red Sea, at 26°N for ships entering via the Gulf of Oman from the north, at 15°S for ships entering via the Indian Ocean from the south, and at 78°E for ships entering via the Indian Ocean from the east.

.2 Monitor Websites

Great care should be taken in voyage planning given that pirate attacks are taking place at extreme ranges from the Somali Coast, including most recently, West Africa. It is critical to obtain the latest information on High Risk Areas from the MSCHOA, NATO Shipping Centre and other relevant websites (see Appendix 1) before planning and executing a voyage. All Navigation Warnings (e.g., SAT C, IMB, ReCAAP or RMI Marine Safety Advisories) also should be monitored and acted upon as appropriate by the ship’s Master.

.3 Review the SSA and SSP

Review the SSA and implementation of the SSP as required by the ISPS Code and RMI Marine Notice 2-011-16 to counter the piracy threat. Companies should have procedures in place to act upon receipt of a ship-to-shore security alert, including notification of the Administrator.

.4 Put the SSP in Place

The Company Security Officer (CSO) is encouraged to ensure that a SSP is in place for a passage through the High Risk Area, and that this is exercised, briefed and discussed with the Master and the Ship Security Officer. See MG 2-11-12 for additional guidance for CSOs in preparing a Company and crew for the contingency of a hijacking in the Western Indian Ocean and GoA.

.5 Offer Route Guidance

Offer the ship’s Master guidance with regard to the recommended routing through the High Risk Area and details of the piracy threat. Guidance should be provided on the available methods of transiting the IRTC (e.g., a Group Transit or National Convoys where these exist.)

- **Group Transits.** Group Transits coordinated by MSCHOA within the IRTC, group vessels together by speed for maximum protection. Further details of Group Transit schemes including departure timings can be found on the MSCHOA website.
- **National Convoys.** A number of naval/military forces offer protected convoys through the IRTC. Details of the convoy schedules may be found on the MSCHOA website.

Reference should be made to the MSCHOA website for the latest routing guidance and naval escorted convoys. See also section 5.3, below.
.6 Plan and Install Ship Protection Measures

The provision of carefully planned and installed Ship Protection Measures prior to transiting the High Risk Area is very strongly recommended. Suggested Ship Protection Measures are set out in section 7.0. Ship Protection Measures significantly increases the prospects of a ship resisting a pirate attack.

.7 Conduct Crew Training

Conduct crew training sessions (including Citadel Drills where utilized) prior to transits and debriefing sessions post transits.

4.2 Upon entering the High Risk Area

.1 Submit “Vessel Movement Registration” Form

A “Vessel Movement Registration” form should be submitted by the ship’s operator (or Masters where vessels have internet access) to MSCHOA before the vessel enters the area bounded by 78°E, 10°S, 23°N and Suez.

Submission of the “Vessel Movement Registration” form may be accomplished directly online or by fax or email. The MSCHOA website (http://www.mschoa.org) should always be consulted to ensure that the most up to date version of the form is used. User ID and Password are required which may be applied for through the website (see 4.1.1, above).

.2 Best Management Practices

Ensure that BMP measures are in place prior to entry into the High Risk Area.

4.3 Use of Private Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP)

.1 The Administrator does not object to vessel owners, operators, and/or Masters taking appropriate measures in regard to the safety and security of their vessels and crew. RMI legislation or regulations do not prohibit the use of PMSC.

.2 Whether to use PCASP and how to facilitate that detail is a decision for the individual vessel owner/operator to make only after conducting a thorough risk assessment of the voyage, consulting with appropriate parties, and ensuring all other practical means of self protection have been employed.

.3 The risk assessment should include and document the following factors and considerations:

- vessel and crew security, safety and protection;
- whether all practical means of self protection have been effectively implemented in advance;
- the potential misuse of firearms resulting in bodily injury or death;
• the potential for unforeseen accidents;
• liability issues, including those related to use of force;
• the potential for escalation of the situation at hand;
• compliance with international and all RMI laws and regulations; and
• careful consideration of any supplemental guidance on PCASP promulgated by the Administrator.

.4 The risk assessment should take into account the guidelines provided in MSC.1/Circ.1405, Rev.2 and include discussions with labour representatives, port officials, charterers, legal counsel, and insurance underwriters as appropriate. It is also important to involve the Master in the decision making process.

.5 The use of PCASP should not be considered an alternative to BMP and other protective measures.

5.0 Master’s Planning

5.1 Prior to Entering the High Risk Area

.1 Crew Briefing

It is recommended that the crew should be fully briefed on the preparations and a drill conducted prior to arrival in the High Risk area. The attack response plan should be reviewed and all personnel briefed on their duties, including familiarity with the alarm signal signifying a piracy attack, the all clear and the appropriate response to each. The drill should also consider the following:

• Testing of the vessel’s Ship Protection Measures, including testing of the security of all access points; and
• Thorough review of the Ship Security Plan.

.2 Emergency Communication Plan

Masters are advised to prepare an emergency communication plan, to include all essential emergency contact numbers and pre-prepared messages, which should be ready at hand or permanently displayed near the external communications stations (e.g., telephone numbers of UKMTO, MSCHOA, MARLO, IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC), CSO, etc.).

.3 Define the Ship’s AIS Policy

SOLAS permits the Master the discretion to switch off AIS if he believes that its use increases the ship’s vulnerability. However, in order to provide naval/military forces with tracking information within the High Risk Area, it is recommended that AIS transmission is left on across the entire High Risk Area, but restrict output to ship’s identity, position, course, speed, navigational status and safety related information only. It should be noted that this is a change in the previous guidance which recommended that AIS be left on only in the Gulf of Aden. If the AIS is switched off during a transit, it should be activated immediately at the time

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of an attack as it will be very difficult for responding naval/military forces to find and identify the ship without it. Masters should check the MSCHOA and NATO Shipping Center websites for any updates on AIS policy prior to passage.

.4 Vessel Movement Registration

Ensure that a “Vessel Movement Registration” submission has been submitted with MSCHOA by the Company four (4) to five (5) days before entering:

- Suez for ships entering the region via the Red Sea;
- The Arabian Gulf at 26°N
- 15° S for ships entering the region via the Indian Ocean (South); and
- 78° E for ships entering the region via the Indian Ocean (East).

If the Form has not been completed and submitted by the Company, the Master should submit it by email/fax. If it is completed by the Company, Masters should satisfy themselves with their companies that their details are correctly registered with MSCHOA. The MSCHOA website (http://www.mschoa.org) should always be consulted to ensure that the most up to date version of the form is used.

.5 Position Reporting

.a Initial Vessel Position Report

i. Masters having registered their ship with MSCHOA should send an Initial Vessel Position Report to UKMTO. Report (noon position, course, speed, and estimated and actual arrival times) to UKMTO and MARLO three (3) to four (4) days before entering the GoA, passing the Coast of Somalia or entering the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The reporting scheme covers the Suez area, Red Sea, Indian Ocean North of 10° S and West of 78° E as well as the Arabian Gulf. The UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Form – Initial Report should be used to make the report. It is very important to understand that naval/military forces cannot be prepared to assist if they are unaware of the ship’s presence and location in the High Risk Areas.

ii. The Administrator recommends, based on actual attacks and shifts in pirate activity, that ships initially report to the UKMTO team on passing the following reference points:

- Suez for ships entering or leaving the region via the Red Sea;
- The Arabian Gulf/Strait of Hormuz at 26°N;
- 15°S for ships entering or leaving the IOR via the Indian Ocean (South); and
- 78° E for ships entering or leaving the region via the Indian Ocean (East).

See Anti-Piracy Planning Chart Q6099 (Appendix IV of this Notice).
iii. Upon receiving the vessel’s initial report, UKMTO will reply giving specific threat guidance relevant at the time. Experience has shown that to transit West of 60° E or within 600 nm of the Somali Coast significantly increases the risk of pirate attacks, although attacks have and will occur East of this area.

.b Report Frequency

Vessels are encouraged to increase the frequency of such reports to hourly intervals when within six (6) hours of entering or navigating within the IRTC.

c Reports to MARLO

As an additional precautionary measure, Masters of vessels are advised to provide passage information to MARLO 48 hours prior to transiting through the GoA via email to marlo.bahrain@me.navy.mil, or telephone +973-1785-1395.

5.2 To Dos when Transiting through the High Risk Area

.1 Minimize Maintenance and Engineering Work by:

• Strictly controlling any work outside of the accommodations and limiting and controlling access points.
• Ensuring all engine room essential equipment is immediately available; no maintenance on essential equipment.

.2 Submit Daily Position Reports

Vessels are strongly encouraged to report daily to the UKMTO and MARLO by email at 08:00 hours GMT while operating within the High Risk Area. The UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Form-Daily Position Report should be used.

.3 Review and Heed All Warnings and Information

The Master (and Company) should appreciate that the voyage routing may need to be reviewed in light of updated information received. This information and warnings may be provided by a number of different means including, NAV WARNINGS-Sat C (and NAVTEXT in limited areas). It is important that all warnings and information are carefully reviewed and considered.

5.3 Group Transit

.1 Naval/military forces, coordinated by MSCHOA, operate the Group Transit Scheme within the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC). This scheme groups vessels together by speed for maximum protection for their transit through the IRTC. Guidance on the Group Transit Scheme, including the departure timings for the different groups, is included on the MSCHOA website or can be obtained by fax from MSCHOA.
a. It is strongly recommended that ships, particularly those that are low and slow, use GT and conduct their passage within the IRTC, where naval/military forces are concentrated.

b. Westbound ships should navigate to the Northern portion of the corridor, and Eastbound ships should navigate in the Southern part of the IRTC.

c. During GTs, ships should not expect to be permanently in the company of a warship or within visual range. But all warships in the GoA, whether part of EU NAVFOR or coordinating with them, will be aware of the GoA GTs and will have access to the full details of vulnerable shipping.

d. MSCHOA strongly recommends Masters make every effort to plan transit periods of highest risk areas of the GoA for night passage (MSCHOA will advise ships). Very few successful attacks have occurred at night.

e. Ships should avoid entering Yemeni Territorial Waters (YTW) or Omani Territorial Waters (OTW) (12 miles) while on transit. This is for reasons of customary international law, as it is very difficult for international naval/military forces (non-Yemeni or Omani) to be able to protect ships that are attacked inside YTW or OTW.

.2 Adjust Passage Plans

Ships may be asked to make adjustments to passage plans to confirm to MSCHOA routing advice. Ships joining a GT should:

• carefully time their arrival to avoid a slow speed approach to the forming up point (Point A or B);
• avoid waiting at the forming up point (Point A or B); and
• note that ships are particularly vulnerable to a pirate attack if they slowly approach or wait at the forming up points (Points A and B).

5.4 National Convoys

Some countries offer independent convoy escorts through the IRTC where merchant vessels are escorted by a warship. Details of the convoy schedules and how to apply to be included are detailed on the MSCHOA website. It should be noted that most national convoys require prior registration to enable vessels to join the convoy. Ships joining national convoys should note the issues regarding Group Transit as they are also highly relevant to vessels timing their arrival at a national convey forming up point.

6.0 Outside the GoA

.1 Great care should be taken in voyage planning in the High Risk Area outside the GoA given that pirate attacks are taking place at extreme range from the Somali Coast. It is recommended that all vessels not making scheduled calls to ports in Somalia, Kenya or Tanzania keep as far from the Somali Coast as possible. Ships transiting South and East of the Coast of Somalia to ports outside of East Africa
The Republic of the Marshall Islands should consider navigating to the East of Madagascar or (for guidance) maintain a distance of more than 600 nm from the coastline and when routing North/South consider keeping East of 60° E Longitude until East of the Seychelles, notwithstanding the fact that the vessel may have PCASP on board. It is important to obtain the latest information from MSCHOA before planning and executing a voyage. Details can be obtained from the MSCHOA website or by fax.

.2 Masters should still update UKMTO in the usual manner with their ship course and details using the UKMTO Vessel Position Reporting Form.

7.0 Ship Protective Measures

7.1 General

The guidance within this section primarily focuses on preparations that might be within the capability of the ship’s crew, or with some external assistance. The guidance is based on experience of piracy attacks to date and may require amendment over time if the pirates change their methods. The Ship Protective measures described in the BMP are the most basic that are likely to be effective. Owners of vessels that make frequent transits through High Risk Areas may consider making further alterations to the vessel and/or provide additional equipment, and/or manpower as a means of further reducing the risk of piracy attack.

.1 If pirates are unable to board a ship, they cannot hijack it.

.2 Harden the ship before it enters the HRA. Check that ship protection measures put in place in advance remain securely fitted and function as intended, being mindful that temporary devices may work loose and consequently may only provide a reduced level of protection.

.3 See Appendix II, Bridge Checklist, as an example of self-protection measures that can be taken to avoid danger.

7.2 Watchkeeping and Enhanced Vigilance

.1 A proper lookout is the single most effective method of ship protection where early warning of a suspicious approach or attack is assured, and where defenses can be readily deployed. Therefore, prior to commencing transit of a High Risk Area, it is recommended that preparations are made to support the requirement for increased vigilance. Consideration should be given to:

- providing additional lookouts/bridge manning, taking into account the vessel’s minimum safe manning certificate and rest hour requirements, to ensure additional lookouts for each Watch; additional lookouts should be fully briefed;
- a shorter rotation of the Watch period in order to maximize alertness of the lookouts.
• manning the engine room;
• ensuring that there are sufficient binoculars for the enhanced bridge team, preferably anti-glare;
• the use of night vision optics;
• maintaining a careful Radar Watch.
• the use of well constructed dummies placed at strategic locations around the vessel (e.g., at the rails to simulate additional lookouts) can give an impression of greater numbers of people on watch. However, if ship design creates lookout black spots and the security assessment identifies this risk, then manpower may have to be used.

7.3 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

.1 Once an attack is underway and pirates are firing weaponry at the vessel, it is difficult and dangerous to observe whether the pirates have managed to gain access. The use of CCTV coverage allows a degree of monitoring of the progress of the attack from a less exposed position. Recorded CCTV footage also may provide useful evidence after an attack. Consider:

• the use of CCTV cameras, if fitted, to ensure coverage of vulnerable areas, particularly the poop deck;
• positioning CCTV monitors at the rear of the bridge in a protected position; and
• locating CCTV monitors at the Safe Muster Point/Citadel (see section 7.13 below).

.2 If CCTV systems are utilized, proper procedures must be in place for maintenance, including documentation of repairs.

7.4 Maneuvering

Practicing maneuvering the vessel prior to entry into the High Risk Area is beneficial and ensures familiarity with the ship’s handling characteristics and how to effect anti-piracy maneuvers whilst maintaining the best possible speed. (Waiting until the ship is attacked before practicing is too late!). Where navigationally safe to do so, Masters are encouraged to practice maneuvering their ships to establish which series of helm orders produce the most difficult sea conditions for pirate skiffs trying to attack, without causing a significant reduction in the ship’s speed. The Master and Officers of the Watch should be familiar with the impact of these zigzag maneuvers onboard their particular ship in all sea conditions.

7.5 Alarms

.1 Sounding the ship’s alarm/whistle serves to inform the vessel’s crew that a piracy attack has commenced and, importantly, demonstrates to any potential attacker that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it. If approached, continuous sounding of the vessel’s foghorn/whistle lets them know they have been seen. It is important to ensure that:
- the Piracy Alarm is distinctive to avoid confusion with other alarms, potentially leading to the crew mustering at the wrong location outside the accommodation;
- crew members are familiar with each alarm, including the signal warning of an attack and an all clear, and the appropriate response to it; and
- exercises are carried out prior to entering a High Risk Area.

7.6 Upper Deck Lighting

.1 It is recommended that the following lights are available and tested:
  - weather deck lighting around the accommodation block and rear facing lighting on the poop deck, consistent with Rule 20(b) of the International Regulations for the Preventing Collision of Sea; and
  - search lights for immediate use when required.

.2 Navigation lights should not be switched off at night. It is recommended that ships proceed with just their navigation lights illuminated and the lighting described above extinguished to avoid leading other ships to assume the ship is at anchor).

.3 Once pirates have been identified or an attack commences, illuminating the lighting described above demonstrates to the pirates that they have been observed.

.4 The Administrator recommends procurement of high altitude white rocket parachute flares for use in illuminating the local vicinity as well.

7.7 Deny Use of Ship’s Tools and Equipment

.1 Pirates generally board vessels with little in the way of equipment other than personal weaponry. It is important to try to deny pirates the use of ship’s tools or equipment that may be used to gain entry into the vessel. Tools and equipment that may be of use to the pirates should be stored in a secure location.

.2 Check all ladders and outboard equipment are stowed or up on deck.

7.8 Protection of Equipment Stored on the Upper Deck

.1 Small arms and other weaponry are often directed at the vessel and are particularly concentrated on the bridge, accommodation section and poop deck.

.2 Consider providing protection, in the form of sandbags or Kevlar blankets, to gas bottles (i.e. oxyacetylene) or containers of flammable liquids that must be stored in these locations.

.3 Ensure that any excess gas bottles or flammable materials are landed prior to transit.
7.9 Control of Access to Bridge, Accommodation and Machinery Spaces

.1 It is very important to control access routes to deter or delay pirates who have managed to board a vessel and are trying to enter accommodation or machinery spaces. It is very important to recognize that if pirates do gain access to the upper deck of a vessel they will be tenacious in their efforts to gain access to the accommodation section and, in particular, the bridge. It is strongly recommended that significant effort is expended prior to entry to the High Risk Area to deny the pirates access to the accommodation and the bridge.

.2 All potential access points (doors, hatches, portholes, vents, etc.) should be risk-assessed and adequately secured, especially where the potential access point is considered large enough for an attacker to gain entry.

.3 All doors and hatches providing access to the bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces should be properly secured to prevent them being opened by pirates.

.4 Careful consideration should be given to the means of securing doors and hatches in order to afford the ship the maximum protection possible.

Access to and from the accommodation and internal work spaces should be reduced to a single point of entry when transiting the High Risk Area.

.5 It is recommended that once doors and hatches are secured, a designated and limited number are used for routine access when required, their use being strictly controlled by the Officer of the Watch (OOW).

.6 Where doors and hatches are required to be closed for watertight integrity, ensure all clips are fully dogged down in addition to any locks. Where possible, additional securing such as with wire strops may enhance hatch security.

.7 Pirates have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The fitting of steel bars to windows will prevent this even if they manage to shatter the window.

.8 Check that all outdoor equipment is stowed or up on the deck. This includes blocking or lifting external ladders on the accommodation block to prevent their use and to restrict external access to the bridge.

.9 Any measures employed should not obstruct an emergency EXIT from within the internal space, while remaining secure from access by pirates outside. Where the door or hatch is located on an escape route from a manned compartment, it is essential that it can be opened by a seafarer trying to effect an exit by that route. Where the door or hatch is locked it is essential that a key is available, in a clear position by the door or hatch.

.10 Prior to entering the High Risk Area procedures for controlling access to accommodation, machinery spaces and store rooms should be set out and practiced.
7.10 Enhanced Bridge Protection

.1 The bridge is usually the focus of any pirate attack. In the initial part of the attack, pirates direct weapons fire at the bridge to try to coerce the ship to stop. If they are able to board the vessel, the pirates usually try to make for the bridge to enable them to take control. Consider:

- providing Kevlar jackets and helmets to the bridge team for enhanced protection during an attack (if possible, jackets and helmets should be in a non-military color);
- while most bridge windows are laminated, further protection against flying glass can be provided by the application of security glass film, often called Blast Resistant Film;
- fabricated metal (steel/aluminum) plates for the side and rear bridge windows and the bridge wing door windows, which may be rapidly secured in place in the event of an attack; and
- the after part of both bridge wings (often open) can be protected by a wall of sandbags.
- The sides and rear of the bridge, and the bridge wings, may be protected with a double layer of chain link fence which has been shown to reduce the effect of an RPG round. Proprietary anti-RPG screens area also available.

7.11 Physical Barriers

Pirates typically use long, lightweight hooked ladders, grappling hooks with rope attached and long hooked poles with a climbing rope attached to board vessels underway. Physical barriers should be used to make it as difficult as possible to gain access to vessels by increasing the height and difficulty of any climb for an attacking pirate.

Before constructing any physical barriers, it is recommended that a thorough survey is conducted to identify areas vulnerable to pirates trying to gain access. Such barriers should not materially impede access to life saving equipment.

.1 Razor Wire

- A robust razor wire barrier is particularly effective if constructed outboard of, or overhanging, the ship’s structure so as to make it difficult for pirates to hook on their boarding ladder (or grappling hook) to the ship’s structure.
- Razor wire (also known as barbed tape) creates an effective barrier when carefully deployed. The barbs on the wire are designed to have piercing and gripping action. Care should be taken when selecting appropriate razor wire as the quality (wire gauge and frequency of barbs) and type will vary considerably. Lower quality razor wire is unlikely to be effective.
- Three main types of razor wire are commonly available: unclipped (straight strand), spiral (like a telephone cord) and concertina (linked spirals). Concertina razor wire is recommended as the linked spirals make it the most effective barrier.
- Razor wire should be constructed of high tensile wire, which is difficult to cut with hand tools. Concertina razor wire coil diameters of approximately 730 mm or 980 mm are recommended.
• When deploying razor wire, personal protective equipment to protect hands, arms and faces must be used. Moving razor wire using wire hooks (like meat hooks) rather than by gloved hand reduces the risk of injury. It is recommended that razor wire is provided in shorter sections (e.g. 10 meter section) as it is significantly easier and safer to use than larger sections which can be very heavy and unwieldy.

• A robust razor wire barrier is particularly effective if it is:
  o Constructed outboard of the ship’s structure (i.e. overhanging) to make it more difficult for pirate to hook on their boarding ladder/grappling hooks to the ship’s structure.
  o Constructed of a double roll of concertina wire-some vessels use a treble roll of concertina razor wire which is even more effective.
  o Properly secured to the vessel to prevent pirates pulling off the razor wire, with for example the hook of a boarding ladder. Consideration should also be given to further securing the razor wire with a wire strop thorough the razor wire to prevent it being dislodged.

.2 Some vessels utilize fixed metal grills topped with metal spikes as an effective barrier.

.3 Electrified Barriers

Electrified barriers are not recommended for hydrocarbon carrying vessels, but following a full risk assessment, can be appropriate and effective for some other types of vessels.

.4 Warning Signs

It is recommended that warning signs of the electrified fence or barrier are displayed-inward facing in English/language of the crew, outward facing in Somali.

The use of such outward facing warning signs might also be considered as a deterrent even if no part of the barrier is actually electrified.

See below for an example of a warning sign.
7.12 Water Spray and Foam Monitors

1. The use of water spray and/or foam monitors has been found to be effective in deterring or delaying pirates attempting to board a vessel. The use of water can make it difficult for a pirate skiff to remain alongside and makes it significantly more difficult for a pirate to try to climb onboard. Options include:

- Fire Hoses and Foam Monitors- Manual operation of hoses and foam monitors is not recommended as this is likely to place the operator in a particularly exposed position and therefore it is recommended that hoses and foam monitors (delivering water) should be fixed in position to cover likely pirate access routes. Improved water coverage may be achieved by using fire hoses in jet mode and by utilizing baffle plates fixed a short distance in front of the nozzle.

- Water cannons-These are designed to deliver water in a vertical sweeping arch thus protecting a greater part of the hull. Many of these have been developed from tank cleaning machines.

- Ballast pumps-Where possible to do so whips may utilize their ballast pumps to flood the deck with water thus providing a highly effective water curtain over the ship’s side. This may be achieved by allowing ballast tanks to overflow on the deck, by using existing pipe-work when in ballast condition, or by retrofitting pipe-work to allow flooding of the decks whilst in loaded condition. Care must be taken to ensure that ballast tanks are not over-pressurized causing damaged to hull and tanks, or vessel stability compromised. If doubt it is recommended that the respective Classification Society be contracted for advice.

- Steam-Hot water, or using a diffuser nozzle to produce steam, to deter pirates has also been found to be very effective in deterring attacks.

- Water spray rails-Some ships have installed spray rails using a Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP) water main, with spray nozzles to produce a water curtain to cover larger areas.

- Foam can be used, but it must be in addition to a vessel’s standard Fire Fighting Equipment (FFE) stock. Foam is effective as it is disorienting and very slippery making it difficult to climb through.

- The following points are also worthy of note:
  - Once rigged and fixed in position, it is recommended that hoses and foam monitors are in a ready state (pressurized and ready for discharge), requiring just the remote activation of fire pumps to commence delivery of water.
  - Where possible, no maintenance should be carried out on the vessel’s seawater systems whilst on passage in the High Risk Area. Note that in order to utilize all pumps additional power may be required and therefore these systems should also be ready for immediate use.
  - Practice, observation, and drills will be required in order to ensure that the results achieved by the equipment, provide effective coverage of vulnerable areas.
7.13 Safe Muster Point

.1 A safe muster point is a designated area chosen to provide maximum physical protection to the crew, preferably low down within the vessel. In the event of a suspicious approach, members of the crew not required on the bridge or the engine control room (ECR) will muster here. A Safe Muster Point is a short-term safe haven, which provides ballistic protection should the pirates commence firing with small arms weaponry or RPGs.

.2 The Administrator recommends that a safe mustering location be designated and mustering procedures rehearsed in order to delay access to control of the ship and to buy time. Ideally this should be away from external bulkheads and portholes. Strategy for placement of a safe muster point also should include due consideration of fire protection systems aboard the vessel.

7.14 Citadel Guidelines

.1 Use of Citadels

a. A Citadel is a designated pre-planned area purpose-built into the ship where, in the event of imminent boarding by pirates, all crew will seek protection. A Citadel is designed and constructed to resist a determined pirate trying to gain entry and provides longer term protection (for a fixed period of time as determined by a risk assessment) of the crew as compared to a safe muster point.

b. Since January 2010 there have been 26 cases where pirates have actually boarded vessels, but have been unable to take control because the vessels crew have all successfully sought refuge in a pre-planned Citadel; however there have also been several cases where Citadels have been breached. This breaching may be attributed to a number of factors, including poor construction and location of the Citadel.

c. With the use of Citadels increasing, the pirates have similarly gained experience in defeating a Citadel. This includes use of weapons, ship board tools and attempts to smoke out the crew and/or set fire to the vessel. Importantly, Somali pirates’ knowledge and modus operandi continue to evolve over time. As their knowledge on Citadels increases, then their ability and methodology in attempting to defeat a citadel will also change, and therefore more robust protection will be required.

d. Initially the Citadel concept was restricted to the GoA where a rapid response by the naval/military forces was considered possible. In these cases the crew generally retreated to a locked Engine Room and thence blacked out the vessel to await assistance. However, more recently attacks and illegal boardings have occurred further out in the Indian Ocean, including the Somali Basin and Arabian Sea. In these cases the possibility of a response by naval/military assets is more remote, and with the paramount consideration being the safety of the crew, it becomes essential that any use of a Citadel is properly planned with all factors being considered.
e. Consideration will have to be taken as to the exact use of the Citadel should the vessel have a Security Team on board. The Citadel will only be effective if all crew, security teams and personnel onboard embarked for the passage are secured within the Citadel. When determining the operating instructions for a Citadel it should be borne in mind that Military Forces will not board a vessel unless all personnel onboard are confirmed as safely secured within the Citadel.

d. If a Citadel is utilized, clear and comprehensive procedures on its use should be written into the SSP. Citadel use should be practiced and drilled in order for all crew to understand their roles, and to train in the time taken to ensure an effective lock down. The procedures also should address rules for exiting the Citadel in cases where the pirates are employing weapons, particularly in anger.

g. Due to the ongoing debate on the use of Citadels and their method of employment, CSOs and Masters are advised to check regularly with the MSCHOA and NATO Shipping Centre website for proper guidance in their establishment and use.

.2 Risk Assessment

a. Any decision to utilize a Citadel should be based upon a thorough risk assessment that is conducted on a ship-by-ship basis. The use of a Citadel should be complementary to, rather than a replacement for, ship protection measures set out in the BMP and in this Notice.

b. The risk assessment, which is dependent upon the vessel’s trading patterns, construction and needs, should consider, but is not limited to:
   • physical size, speed and vulnerability of the vessel;
   • the ability to meet the Citadel criteria as provided in section 7.14.4, below;
   • geographical trading area including consideration that the naval/military forces may not be able to offer assistance;
   • that all other avenues of self protection based upon the BMP have been effectively implemented; and
   • the potential consequences of an escalation of the situation.

.3 Citadel Design

a. A Citadel must be designed and constructed to resist a determined pirate trying to gain entry. If the risk assessment determines that a citadel is required, consideration should be given to:
   • Location of the Citadel
   • Time frame for Citadel survivability
   • Construction of the Citadel
   • Use and operation of the Citadel
   • Naval/military forces response/assistance
b. New ships should be designed with security and safety in mind, particularly if contemplating transits through High Risk Areas. During the design and construction process, consideration should be given as how best to ensure that the accommodation block and decks can be locked down while still meeting all relevant SOLAS requirements, including those for fire protection and means of escape.

c. Establishment of a Citadel is likely beyond the capability of a ship’s staff alone and may well require external technical advice and support. Owners/operators should contact the Administrator for more specific guidance on the construction and use of citadels.

.4 Military Considerations

a. Having a Citadel does not guarantee a naval/military force response.

b. Naval/military forces apply criteria before considering a boarding operation to release crew from the Citadel. These criteria are contained on the MSCHOA and NATO Shipping Centre websites and currently are as follows:

- 100% of the crew must be secured in the Citadel (Remember: the whole concept of a Citadel approach is lost if any crew member is left outside before it is secured).
- The crew of the ship must have self contained, independent, reliable 2-way external communications (sole reliance on VHF communications is not sufficient).
- The pirates must be denied access to ship propulsion.

c. Other factors which determine the ability of the naval/military forces to respond even if the conditions in b. above are satisfied include:

- The location of the vessel that has been boarded illegally in relation to the naval vessel. In addition to any geographic limitations between two vessels, some naval assets have a strict area of operations which are imposed upon them. They are not permitted to use force outside of this area.
- In many cases the naval/military force is required to have a specially trained team on board to enable an ‘opposed boarding’ to be conducted.
- The naval/military forces may have to obtain approval for an opposed boarding from the flag state of the vessel to be boarded and from the Foreign Office for all Nationalities on board. The Administrator is required to provide UKMTO in writing assurances that all personnel onboard are confirmed by the CSO to be safely secured within the Citadel before military forces will be authorized to attempt an opposed boarding of a vessel.
- Weather considerations may prohibit an opposed boarding.
Any opposed boarding takes time to plan and requires assistance from the owners/ship operators.

Owners should have/keep ship plans available to send to the military in suitable electronic format.

7.15 Crew Training and Drills

.1 Proper awareness and security training for crew members is essential and one (1) of the best self-protective measures available. Owners and operators are encouraged to provide training and drills to their crews – from the most junior levels up to Masters-on how to respond to an attack.

7.16 Other Measures

.1 Consider minimizing external communications (radios, handsets and AIS information) to essential safety and security related communication and SOLAS information only, during transit of the GoA and passing the Coast of Somalia.

.2 Increase readiness and redundancy by running additional auxiliary machinery, including generators and steering motors.

.3 If the ship has a comparatively low freeboard, consider the possibility of extending the width of the gunwales to prevent grappling hooks from gaining hold. Check the MSCHOA website for examples of such measures.

8.0 In Transit – Operations

8.1 Ship’s crew should not be exposed to undue risk when employing Self Protective Measures (SPMs).

8.2 All ships inside the GoA are strongly urged to use the IRTC and follow MSCHOA GT advice and timings as promulgated on the MSCHOA website.

8.3 If you intend to follow a GT through the IRTC: Transit at the GT speed but remain aware of the ship’s limitations. (Current advice, for example, is that if your maximum speed is 16 knots, consider joining a 14 knot GT and keep those 2 knots in reserve.)

8.4 If you do not intend to follow a GT through the IRTC: Maintain full sea speed through the High Risk Area. (Current advice is that if the maximum speed of the ship is more than 18 knots, then do not slow down for a GT, maintain speed and aim to transit as much of the High Risk Area in darkness as possible).

8.5 Maintain maximum CPA with any ship acting suspiciously.

8.6 Ships should continue to report their noon positions and speed, actual departure times and estimated arrival times during transit using UTC.

8.7 Ships should comply with the International Rules for Prevention of Collision at Sea at all times; navigation lights should not be turned off at night. Masters should endeavor not to impede the safe navigation of other vessels when joining and leaving the IRTC.
8.8 Provide deck lighting only as required for safety. Lighting in the shadow zones around
the ship’s hull may extend the area of visibility for lookouts, but only where consistent
with safe navigation. Where fitted, and deemed suitable, consider the immediate use of
“remotely operated” ship search lights. If suspicious activity around the vessel is
observed, the use of search lights may startle and deter a potential attack. Current naval
advice is to transit with navigation lights only.

8.9 Keep photographs of pirate “mother ships” on the bridge. Immediately report all
sightings of suspect mother ships to UKMTO and the IMB PRC at:

UKMTO: +971 505 523 215 / ukmto@eim.ae

IMB PRC: +60 3 2031 0014 / imbkl@icc-ccs.org or piracy@icc-ccs.org

Such reports may also be relayed to MSCHOA or MARLO using the following contact
details:

MSCHOA: postmaster@mschoa.org

MARLO: +973 39401395 / marlo.bahrain@me.navy.mil

Such reporting will aid in building a clearer picture of pirate activity which will assist in
better protecting shipping and eradicate the threat to freedom of navigation in the area.
(See Appendix III of this Notice for an RMI Report of Piracy and/or Armed Robbery
Against Vessels (MI-109-2) form for forwarding such information or any other
information concerning an attack or sighting.)

8.10 The Master should try to make as early an assessment of a threat as possible. As soon as
the Master feels that a threat is developing he should immediately activate the SSAS and
call the UKMTO.

8.11 Keep a good lookout for suspicious craft, especially from astern. Note that most attacks
to date have occurred from the port quarter.

8.12 Protect the crew from exposure to undue risk. Only essential work on deck should occur
in transit of the high risk area. Masters should, in so far as possible, keep crew members
clear from external deck spaces during hours of darkness, while being mindful of their
obligation to maintain a full and proper lookout in all directions at all times.

8.13 Use light, alarm bells and crew activity to alert suspected pirates that they have been
detected.

8.14 A variety of other additional commercially available non-lethal defensive measures are
available that could be considered; however, these should be assessed by companies on
their merits and on the particular characteristics of the ship concerned.

9.0 Pirate Attack – Approach Stage

9.1 Pirates generally do not use weapons until they are within two cables of a vessel,
therefore any period up until this stage can be considered “approach,” and gives a vessel
valuable time in which to activate its defenses and make it clear to pirates that they have
been seen and the vessel is prepared and will resist.
9.2 Initiate and follow the ship’s pre-prepared emergency procedures plan.

9.3 In addition to the emergency alarms and announcements for the benefit of the vessel’s crew sound the ship’s whistle/foghorn continuously to demonstrate to any potential attacker that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it.

9.4 If not already at full speed, increase to a maximum to open the CPA. Try to steer a straight course to maintain a maximum speed.

9.5 If the Master has exercised the right to turn off the AIS during transit of the piracy area, this should be turned on.

9.6 Activate the Emergency Communication Plan

- Activate the SSAS, which will alert your CSO and the Flag Administrator.
- Make ‘Mayday” call on VHF Ch. 16 (and backup Ch. 08, which is monitored by naval units).
- Sound the emergency alarm and make a “Pirate Attack” announcement in accordance with the ship’s emergency procedures plan.
- Call in order of priority:
  .1 UKMTO (+971 50 552 3215);
  .2 MSCHOA (+44(0) 1923 958545)
  .3 MARLO (+973 3940 1395)
  .4 IMB (+60 3 2098 5763)
- Once established maintain contact with UKMTO. An attack should be reported to UKMTO even if a vessel is part of a national convoy so other merchant ships can be warned.
- Send a distress message via the Digital Selective Calling system (DSC) and Inmarsat-C, as applicable.

9.7 All crew, except those required on the bridge or in the engine room, should muster either at their designated Safe Muster Point or the Citadel if the ship is appropriately constructed so that the crew are given as much ballistic protection as possible should the pirates get close enough to use weapons.

9.8 Activate water and spray (e.g., fire pump) and other appropriate self-defensive measures.

9.9 Ensure that all external doors and, where possible, internal public rooms and cabins, are fully secured.

10.0 **Pirate Attack – Attack Stage**

10.1 Reconfirm that all ship’s personnel are in a position of safety.

10.2 As the pirates close in on the vessel, Masters should commence small alternations of helm whilst maintaining speed to deter skiffs from lying alongside the vessel in preparation for a boarding attempt. These maneuvers will create additional wash to impede the operation of the skiffs.
10.3 Substantial amounts of helm are not recommended, as these are likely to significantly reduce a vessel’s speed.

10.4 If the bridge/engine room is to be evacuated the main engine should be stopped and all way taken off the vessel if possible (and if navigationally safe to do so). All remaining crew members should proceed to the designated Safe Muster Point.

11.0 Pirate Attack – Pirates Take Control Stage

11.1 Before the pirates gain access to the bridge, inform UKMTO. Ensure that the SSAS has been activated, and ensure that the AIS is switched on.

11.2 Offer no resistance to the pirates once they reach the bridge. Once on the bridge the pirates are likely to be aggressive, highly agitated and possibly under the influence of drugs (including khat, an amphetamine like stimulant); so remaining clam and cooperating fully will greatly reduce the risk of harm.

11.3 If the bridge/engine room is to be evacuated, then the main engine should be stopped, all way taken off the vessel, if possible (and if navigationally safe to do so), All remaining crew members should proceed to the designated Safe Muster Point with their hands visible.

11.4 Leave any CCTV running.

12.0 In the Event of Military Action

12.1 In the event that naval/military forces take action onboard the ship, all personnel should keep low to the deck, cover their head with both hands (always ensuring that hands are visible and not holding anything) and make no sudden movements unless directed to by friendly forces.

12.2 Military Forces may initially secure all persons encountered and question their identity. This is standard practice. Brief and prepare ship’s personnel to expect this and to cooperate fully during the initial stages of military action onboard.

12.3 Do not use flash photography.

12.4 Be aware that English is not the working language of all naval units in the region. This is why early registration with MSCHOA, use of GT timings, and updating your position with UKMTO are essential. They all provide a better probability that naval support will be nearby and ready to respond immediately if the pirates attack.

12.5 Naval/military forces will endeavour to respond rapidly to ongoing acts of piracy. However, because of the very large distances across the High Risk Area a Naval/military response may not be possible.
13.0 Post-Incident Reporting

13.1 Following any piracy attack or suspicious activity, it is vital that a detailed report of the event is reported to MSCHOA, UKMTO, IMB and the Administrator.

13.2 This will ensure full analysis and trends in piracy activity are established as well as enabling assessment of piracy techniques or changes in tactics, in addition to ensuring appropriate warnings can be issued to the merchant shipping in the vicinity.

13.3 Masters are therefore requested to complete the piracy report form contained in Appendix III of this Notice. The report should contain descriptions and distinguishing features of any suspicious vessels that were observed. The report form can be used for submissions to the international organizations (e.g., MSCHOA, UKMTO, MARLO, IMB, IMO) as well as to the Administrator.

14.0 Prosecution of Pirates

14.1 The capture, prosecution and sentencing of pirates and armed robbers is one of the most appropriate deterrent actions available to Governments, including the RMI. Moreover, for naval/military forces to hold suspected pirates following a piracy incident, a witness statement from those affected from the piracy incident is necessary.

14.2 The RMI conducts its investigations, including those involving piracy and armed robbery, in accordance with the IMO Code of International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation Into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident (Casualty Investigation Code) as adopted by Resolution MSC 255(84) and as prescribed in MI-260, Rules for Marine Investigations, and MI-264, Rules for Marine Administrative and Adjudicatory Proceedings.

14.3 Those investigating crimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships should be conducting their investigation in accordance with the IMO guidelines contained in MSC.1/Circ.1404. These guidelines recognize the flag State’s right to conduct its own investigation as well as its need for immediate access to the ship and crew upon the ship’s arrival.

14.4 Proper evidence collection is an important part of building a case against suspected pirates. INTERPOL, an international police organization of which the RMI is a member, offers assistance to ship owners/operators in taking appropriate steps to preserve the integrity of the evidence left behind at the crime scene. It is recommended that ship owners/operators contact INTERPOL’s Maritime Piracy Task Force through its Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC) within three (3) days of a hijacking of their vessel. See Appendix 1 for INTERPOL contact details.

14.5 Should an RMI vessel be attacked by pirates, the Administrator shall coordinate with naval/military officials and Interpol for cooperation in the investigation. RMI owners/operators of such vessels are requested to contact the Administrator for further guidance on this post incident coordination.
15.0 Post-Piracy Care for Seafarers

15.1 Adherence to the BMP and the presence of naval escorts in High Risk Areas have been shown to reduce the risks of pirate attacks. In spite of these precautions, pirates remain unpredictably capable of attacking and hijacking vessels, placing crew members in harm’s way. The Seaman’s Church Institute has published guidelines for addressing the needs of the crew and their families should a ship be attacked. These guidelines (reference (j) of this Notice) are provided for informational purposes in Appendix V of this Notice.

15.2 Prior to or during employment on a MI flag vessel, seafarers shall undergo, or provide proof by submitting a new MI-105 form, that they have undergone a medical exam, including mental health evaluation/counseling, should they have been recently subject to a situation involving robbery, hostage taking or piracy aboard a vessel.

16.0 Yachts

16.1 Advice Against Operations in High Risk Areas

Sailing vessels are particularly vulnerable to attack due to their low speed and low freeboard. The Maritime Administrator strongly advises against any operation and travel by RMI flagged yachts in the following High Risk Areas:

- Gulf of Aden;
- Arabian Sea;
- Indian Ocean and Red Sea as bounded by the following latitude and longitude: 15°N in the Red Sea, 26°N in the Arabian Sea, 78°E and 15°S in the Indian Ocean and the Mozambique Channel; and
- Gulf of Guinea, West Africa.
- Straits of Malacca
- South China Sea

16.2 Precautions

Should such travel be deemed essential in the High Risk Areas identified in section 16.1, above, the Maritime Administrator highly recommends that Masters and owners/operators:

(a) Follow, to the extent practicable for yachts, the Best Management Practices (BMP) as contained in this Notice. This includes considering the necessity (assessing of the risk) of travel through High Risk Areas and alternatives, such as transporting the vessel by yacht carrier.

(b) Register with the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) for up-to-date advice and guidance on passage around the Horn of Africa. See Appendix 1 for contact information.
(c) Report regularly to the UK Maritime Trade Organization (UKMTO) Dubai by providing position, course and speed. See Appendix 1 for contact information.

(d) Discuss the proposed voyage with your insurers and/or P and I Club prior to sailing.

(e) Update emergency plans regularly with the latest advice provided by informational sources, including the MSCHOA, IMB and the International Sailing Federation (ISAF). See Appendix 1 for contact information.

(f) For a discussion on the carriage and use of PMSC (i.e., armed or unarmed guards), see section 4.3, above.
APPENDIX I
CONTACT LIST OF MILITARY AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

The following authorities have roles in combating piracy and other attacks against merchant shipping.

1.0 MSCHOA

1.1 MSCHOA is the planning and coordination authority for EU Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR). A Ship and its passage plan should be registered with MSCHOA at http://www.mschoa.org prior to entering the High Risk Area (including the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC)). Note that the EUNAVFOR operational area does not extend East of 65° East.

1.2 MSCHOA may be reached directly at:

+44 (0) 1923 958545 (telephone)
+44 (0) 1923 958520 (fax)
postmaster@mschoa.org (email)

2.0 UKMTO

2.1 UKMTO office in Dubai is the first point of contact for ships in the region. The day-to-day interface between Masters and the naval/military forces is provided by UKMTO which talk to merchant ships and liaise directly with MSCHOA and the naval commanders at sea and ashore. UKMTO administers a Voluntary Reporting Scheme, under which merchant ships are encouraged to send regular updates on their position and intended movements. These reports are comprised of:

- Initial Report;
- Daily Reports; and
- Final Report (upon departure from the high risk area or arrival in port).

UKMTO uses the emerging and relevant information from these reports to help the naval/military units maintain an accurate picture of shipping, thereby improving responsiveness to any incident. UKMTO is also a material source of information on the establishment and use of citadels.

2.2 The preferred method of communication with UKMTO for routine reporting is email to ukmto@eim.ae; Fax: +971-4-306-5710; or Telex: (51) 210473.

2.3 In case of emergency, the UKMTO may be reached by the 24-hour Duty Phone:

+971-50-552-3215
3.0 MARLO Information Exchange

3.1 MARLO operates as a conduit for information exchange between the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the commercial shipping community within the region.

3.2 Passage information should be provided to MARLO 48 hours prior to transiting through the GoA via email to marlo.bahrain@me.navy.mil, telephone +973-1785-3925, or cell +973-1785-1395.

3.3 In case of emergency, the MARLO may be reached by the 24-hour Duty Phone:

+973-3940-1395

4. NATO Shipping Centre (NSC)

NSC provides the commercial link with NATO’s Maritime Forces. The NSC is NATO’s primary point of contact with the maritime community and is used by NATO as the tool for communicating and coordinating initiatives and efforts with other military entities (e.g., UKMTO, MSCHOA and MARLO) as well as directly with the maritime community.

Telephone: +44(0) 1923 956574
Fax: +44(0) 1923 956575
Email: info@shipping.nato.int
Website: www.shipping.nato.int

5.0 IMB

5.1 IMB is a specialized division of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) whose principal area of expertise is in the suppression of piracy through its PRC in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It maintains a 24/7 watch system reporting pirate attacks in this area to the CMF and issuing warnings about hotspots. It also offers valuable advice as to what to do when pirates actually succeed in getting aboard.

5.2 It is recommended that Masters of vessels transiting the GoA include the IMB PRC as part of the reporting procedures by email to imbkl@icc-ccs.org.

5.3 In case of emergency, the IMB may be reached by the 24/7 Helpline Number: +60-3-2031-0014 or by the 24/7 Help Email: piracy@icc-ccs.org.

5.4 Other useful IMB contact points are:

IMB PRC website: www.icc-ccs.org
Fax: +60 3 2078 5769
Telex: MA34199 IMBPCI.
6.0 COMUSNAVCENT Battlewatch Captain

When transiting the Strait of Hormuz, as soon as the Master feels that the threat is developing, he/she should immediately call to report hostile or potentially hostile action to:

COMUSNAVCENT Battlewatch Captain at +973-1785-3879.

7.0 ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre

Tel: +65 6376 3091
Fax: +65 6376 3066
Website: www.recaap.org
Email: secretariat@recaap.org

8.0 INTERPOL

INTERPOL is an international police organization with 188 member countries that facilitates cross border police co-operation to combat international crime. INTERPOL hosts a secure website to provide support to ship operators who have had their vessels hijacked by pirates. Their Maritime Piracy Task Force can assist in taking the appropriate steps to preserve the integrity of the evidence left behind the crime scene. The INTERPOL Command and Co-ordination Centre (CCC) operators in all four of INTERPOL’s official languages—English, French, Spanish and Arabic.

Website: www.interpol.int
Email: os-ccc@interpol.int
Telephone (24 hrs): +33(0) 4 72 44 76 76

9.0 The International Sailing Federation (ISAF)

The ISAF has posted guidelines and warnings for yachts on their website at: www.sailing.org/piracy.

10.0 Marshall Islands Duty Officer

Tel: +1-703-476-3762
Email: dutyofficer@register-iri.com
APPENDIX II
BRIDGE CHECKLIST

Vessel owners, operators, Master and crew should limit and avoid danger by taking these additional measures:

☐ Transit the GoA by way of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC).
☐ Maintain a minimum distance of 60° E Longitude from the East Coast of Somalia.
☐ Avoid sailing between Socotra and Somalia and through the Mozambique Channel.
☐ Maintain high alert and be on the lookout for small craft in the Strait of Hormuz.
☐ Maintain at least 50 nm radius around Socotra.
☐ Establish special operating procedures for vigilance and for the event of an attack.
☐ Practice piracy drills, provide refresher training for the crew concerning anti-piracy measures.
☐ Ensure crew radios and in-vessel communications are in good working order.
☐ Secure a pre-designated safe mustering point for crewmembers to gather.
☐ Secure alternative steering location, if possible.
☐ Maintain a single point of entry into the house.
☐ Secure deck lighting (except for mandatory navigation lights).
☐ Maintain contact numbers for MARLO and UKMTO in the wheelhouse.
☐ Increase monitoring of VHF communications on Channel 16 (back-up Channel 08).
☐ Keep unnecessary communications to a minimum except to make contact with naval units and other vessels as soon as the vessel enters the High Risk Area.
☐ Continue the use of AIS but limit information to Vessel Name and Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) so that it may still be identified by coalition forces. Coalition Maritime Forces have AIS monitoring capability.
☐ All available radars should be used and constantly monitored.
☐ Post additional 24-hour lookouts forward, amidships and aft.
☐ Maintain a 24-hour watch by crew for suspicious activity, including a sharp lookout for suspicious small boats operating in the vicinity.
☐ Increase and maintain speed to at least 15 kts. The faster the better.
☐ Maneuver to avoid small craft and take aggressive evasive measures, if necessary.
☐ Take defensive precautions prior to entering the area including rigging fire hoses, spotlights, concertina wire, etc. Experience has demonstrated the use of high pressure fire hoses to be very effective at repelling boarders.
☐ Consider other non-lethal measures such as focused sonic devices, guard dog security teams, etc.
# APPENDIX III

## MI-109-2, REPORT OF PIRACY AND/OR ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST VESSELS

**OFFICE OF THE MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR**  
**REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS**  
**11495 Commerce Park Drive**  
**Reston, Virginia 20191-1506 USA**

**REPORT OF ACTS OF PIRACY AND/OR ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST VESSELS**

**INSTRUCTIONS**

1. This form is to be completed to report incidents of piracy, armed attacks, hijacking or terrorism.
2. An original of this form shall be submitted to the Maritime Administrator as soon after the occurrence of the incident (attempted or actual).
3. This form must be completed in full. Entries which do not relate to a particular case should be indicated as not applicable by inserting the initials “N/A.”
4. This form should be completed by the Master or person in charge, or, if neither is available, by the owner or his duly authorized agent.
5. Attach separate form MI-109-1 to this report for each person injured, killed, or incapacitated in excess of 72 hours as a result of this incident.
6. Attach separate form MI-109 to this report for any damage or loss to/of vessel.

## I. VESSEL PARTICULARS / OWNER / SHIPMANAGER

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Vessel Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Official Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>IMO Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Gross Tonnage and Length Overall</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Vessel Type</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Propulsion Type and Rated Horsepower / KW</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Ship’s Freeboard (Meters)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Forward: Amidships: Aft:</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Name of Owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Ship Management’s Name, Address and Telephone including CSO’s and/or DPA’s Name, Email and Telephone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Cargo Details (Type/Quantity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Numbers of Crew and Nationality – Leave blank if crew list attached</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## II. ATTACK PARTICULARS / VESSEL POSITION AND STATUS

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Type of Attack</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>✅ Attack Successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☐ Attack thwarted by external forces</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☐ Attack thwarted by ships practices</td>
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<td></td>
<td>☐ Attack aborted</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>☐ Suspicious Activity</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Date of Incident</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Time</td>
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<td>UTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Zone Description</td>
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<td>16.</td>
<td>Period of Day</td>
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<td>Day</td>
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<td>Night</td>
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<td>Twilight</td>
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<td>17.</td>
<td>Visibility</td>
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<td></td>
<td>☐ &lt; 2 miles</td>
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<td></td>
<td>☐ 2-5 miles</td>
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<td></td>
<td>☐ &gt; 5 miles</td>
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<td>18.</td>
<td>Wind</td>
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<td>Force: Direction (“True”):</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td>Sea State</td>
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<td>Wave height:</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Swell height:</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Geographic Location of Vessel at Time of Incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a) Latitude</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Longitude</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(c) Geographical Name of Body of Water</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(d) Last Port of Departure</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(e) Date of Departure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II. ATTACK PARTICULARS / VESSEL POSITION AND STATUS (continued)

(f) Scheduled Port of Arrival

(g) Date of Expected Arrival

21. If attacked at anchor - name of anchorage

In port limits

☐ Yes ☐ No

MARSEC Level

22. If attacked while moored alongside - name of port facility

MARSEC Level

21. If attacked while underway

(a) Ship Heading:

Degrees True

(b) Speed:

Knots

III. SHORE / PORT AUTHORITY CONTACT DETAILS

23. Notified applicable authorities (Maritime Administrator, Coastal State, UKMTO, Port Authority, etc.)

☐ No

☐ Yes If Yes, to whom:

24. Reported to Port Facility Security Officer

☐ No ☐ Yes If Yes, name and contact details

25. Actions taken by shore or port authorities e.g., Coastal State, UKMTO, Naval Task Forces, etc.

26. Preferred method of vessel’s external communications (SATCOM, Radio, other)

IV. INCIDENT DETAILS

27. Method used by perpetrators to cause the vessel to lay-to and/or embark the vessel

28. Type of weapons used by perpetrators

29. Number of perpetrators involved and duration of attack, type of attack (e.g., attempted/ boarded. whether attack was aggressive / violent)

30. Suspected or known identity and description of perpetrators (e.g., dress, physical appearance, language spoken, if known)
### IV. INCIDENT DETAILS (continued)

31. Details of incident (In addition to above type of small craft and communication equipment please describe: how vessel was approached; how perpetrators boarded vessel; and how perpetrators established control of crew. Attach separate sheets if necessary.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Details of incident</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(In addition to above type of small craft and communication equipment please describe: how vessel was approached; how perpetrators boarded vessel; and how perpetrators established control of crew. Attach separate sheets if necessary.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32. Consequences to crew (During the attack and treatment while perpetrators were onboard - attach separate sheets if necessary.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consequences to crew</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(During the attack and treatment while perpetrators were onboard - attach separate sheets if necessary.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33. Post incident consequences and impacts (e.g., Noticeable changes in crew’s behavior, morale, damages to the ship (description), items stolen (estimated financial impact), other, etc. - attach separate sheet if necessary.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post incident consequences and impacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(e.g., Noticeable changes in crew’s behavior, morale, damages to the ship (description), items stolen (estimated financial impact), other, etc. - attach separate sheet if necessary.)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

34. Incident Prevention & Response Actions (As appropriate address effectiveness of Best Management Practices (BMP), armed security team, citadel, how crew was internally alerted, use of SSAS, etc. - attach separate sheet if necessary.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incident Prevention &amp; Response Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(As appropriate address effectiveness of Best Management Practices (BMP), armed security team, citadel, how crew was internally alerted, use of SSAS, etc. - attach separate sheet if necessary.)</td>
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</table>

35. Recommended SSP & BMP amendments (Proposed new measures needed to prevent recurrence, i.e., set higher MARSEC level, additional lighting, employment of an armed security team, etc. - attach separate sheet if necessary.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
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### V. REPORT

36. Date of Report 37. Submitted by (Print Name)

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38. Signature 39. Title

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APPENDIX IV

ANTI-PIRACY PLANNING CHART – RED SEA, GULF OF ADEN AND ARABIAN SEA
APPENDIX V

POST-PIRACY CARE FOR SEAFARERS

POST-PIRACY CARE FOR SEAFARERS
GUIDELINES

CENTER FOR SEAFARERS’ RIGHTS
THE SEAMEN’S CHURCH INSTITUTE

AUG 1, 2011
VERSION 3.0

PREAMBLE The following guidelines are intended to provide a general structure for caring for seafarers following a piracy incident. These guidelines emerge from a study currently underway at the Seamen’s Church Institute (SCI) designed to develop recommendations for clinical assessment and intervention. SCI welcomes comments from interested parties as develops specific guidelines to address the mental health impact of piracy on seafarers. This document addresses a continuum—from transiting high-risk areas without incident to prolonged captivity of seafarers.

1. ANTICIPATING THE POSSIBILITY OF PIRACY
Piracy threatens 21st century seafarers. While most piracy incidents are thought to take place around the Horn of Africa, piracy remains problematic on the West Coast of Africa, the Indian Ocean and throughout the South East Asian archipelago. Although adherence to Best Management Practices (BMP), presence of Group Transits via EUNA FOR and national naval escorts through the Gulf of Aden have reduced the risks of attacks, pirates remain unpredictably capable of attacking and hijacking vessels throughout the whole high-risk area as defined in the BMP. Because of this, all maritime industry stakeholders should take preparatory steps to protect the well-being of their crews at sea, from stress management techniques to coping with prolonged activity.

1.1 THE MAINTENANCE OF ACCURATE MEDICAL INFORMATION Shipowners should maintain accurate health records for their crews. Complete medical records include the results of the most recent physical examination and details about any medical condition that could worsen at sea. This includes any medication-dependent condition, as well as any physical ailment that could deteriorate in a high stress setting. A detailed history should provide information about prior surgeries, immunizations, allergies, family medical history, and a complete personal history, including information about prior illnesses and major life events (marriages, divorces, deaths of loved ones). This information facilitates immediate follow-up medical planning for release of a captive seafarer.

1.2 ANTICIPATORY TRAINING Seafarers should develop appropriate instincts and survival skills necessary to contend with captivity. Seafarers gain mental confidence through drills aboard the vessel that practice deterrence techniques. Seafarers should be trained in basic captive survival skills that anticipate their interaction with hostile pirates. Cultural sensitivity training to avoid offending and angering the pirates should be included. Anticipating crew isolation or group adhesion issues can strengthen morale during prolonged captivity. Most importantly, seafarers should understand known intimidation tactics used by pirates, including: 1) providing frightening misinformation about family members; 2) suggesting that the ship owners will neglect them; 3) physical abuse; 4) death threats or mock executions; 5) psychological tactics aimed at isolating or dividing crew or breaking crew morale, increasing their desperation, and thus pressuring negotiations.
2. AT THE FIRST NEWS OF A PIRACY INCIDENT
The news of a piracy incident can induce panic among all involved. Clear and reliable lines of communication between the vessel and its stakeholders and between stakeholders and the families of the crew pay huge dividends in managing palpable anxiety and distracting rumors. Therefore, regular briefings become critical from the first sign of a problem. While respecting confidential negotiations, clarifying even partially known information regarding crew location and conditions builds trust among ship management, media and family members.

2.1 WORKING WITH CREWMEMBERS’ FAMILIES should be notified immediately of an incident to avoid their finding out first from potentially intrusive news outlets. After the first contact, families should be updated by telephone, if possible, or by email at intervals no greater than 24 hours-- even if nothing has progressed. Shipowners should also prepare relatives for the possibility that pirates, as part of their intimidation tactics, will contact them. Families should be instructed to refrain from making statements to the press about the situation, since publicity may impede effective negotiation and may prolong captivity of loved ones. Further; the seafarers’ dependents should be reassured that they will receive compensation from the shipowners according to contract provisions.

3. WHEN A CREW IS BEING HELD
When pirates hold a vessel captive, often little that can be done directly to address the needs of the crew. While negotiations are underway, however, several procedures can begin.

3.1 PREPARING FOR THE CREW’S RELEASE Individual crewmember potential needs should be identified before release. This information should be solicited from the crewmembers medical records, and family members. Importantly, this includes anticipating pre-existing conditions that might worsen under captivity. Examples include:

- Conditions that require medication that may run out during captivity
- Conditions that worsen under stress, including but not limited to: cardiac problems, including histories of arrhythmias, heart attacks [myocardial infarctions]; stroke; asthma, emphysema, or chronic bronchitis; anxiety disorders; post-traumatic stress disorder.

Anticipating possible reactions among crewmembers based on knowledge of their medical history facilitates preparation for their release.

3.2 PROVIDING TIMELY INFORMATION TO THE CREW’S FAMILIES As stated in 2.1, families should be updated on a daily basis. Families should be provided a named point-of-contact who remains available to them by email and telephone. Much like the owners of hijacked vessels and others with vested interests, families of crewmembers may feel powerless and afraid. Unlike those involved in negotiating, however, families have no access to current information. Allying with families enhances their ability to assist with recovery that might be needed by providing supportive home environments, helping to identify delayed symptoms from captivity, and by helping link crewmembers with appropriate caregivers (medical centers. behavioral health clinics).

Families should be asked to maintain the confidentiality of all information shared and not disclose this information to the media. Families should be encouraged to report any attempts by pirates to communicate with them, and families should be encouraged not to respond to these attempts.
3.3 ANTICIPATING THE SEAFARER’S POTENTIAL NEEDS While most seafarers will be protected by their natural resilience from debilitating post-captivity side effects, ship operators should anticipate that crewmembers will need follow-up care. In the midst of a hostage situation, ship operators and insurance companies can identify qualified professionals in the seafarer’s home community who can provide care, if needed. Contact information of available and properly trained and licensed medical doctors and mental health professionals (psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, licensed counselors) should be maintained. These professionals should be placed on standby for possible treatment. These services, when required, should be covered as part of the standard medical follow-up offered to the seafarer.

4. WHEN RELEASE IS IMMINENT

4.1 PREPARATIONS Plans should be made to inform families immediately after seafarers are released. Families should be encouraged to respect the confidentiality of negotiations and be prepared for the possibility of modifications to any timetable provided. Preparations should be made for crewmembers to be provided with telephones as close to release as possible to talk with loved ones.

4.2 A DEBRIEFING PROTOCOL Debriefing should include appropriate company, military, and medical interviews. Immediate medical triage evaluates apparent illness/injury and future risk for conditions that could impede a crewmember’s ability to return to work or pose a risk to life. An evaluation that conforms to established standards should be made (the M.I.N.I., for example, provides suitable measure of emotional functioning that could be used for this purpose). Evaluations should be performed by licensed medical doctors or allied health professionals (e.g., nurses) qualified to conduct assessments.

5. WHEN THE CREW HAS BEEN RELEASED

5.1 MEDICAL ASSESSMENT Evaluation should be made as soon as possible. Ideally, this should precede any debriefing. Information that government/military personnel receive from a detainee will be less accurate if disclosed in the context of significant medical or psychological distress. Qualified medical or allied health professionals (e.g., nurses, social workers) should conduct assessments. Written summary of the assessment, describing the seafarer’s physical and emotional state, should be translated into the seafarer’s native language by a competent medical translator and given to the crewmember to take home to his local medical providers. Also, the seafarer should receive an up-to-date list of professionals and facilities near the seafarer’s home capable of providing follow-up assessment and care as needed. The seafarer’s personal medical information should be treated as protected and private. No other stakeholders, including the agency funding the assessment, should be allowed access to this information. This policy should be extended to all of the seafarer’s confidential health information. Medical data required to determine fitness for employment should be gathered in a separate medical evaluation, also at company expense.

5.2 REPATRIATION Following release, crew should be sent back to home countries as soon as possible after being cleared for travel. When crewmembers are cannot leave the point of disembarkation for more than three (3) days, efforts should be made to facilitate family travel to that point to expedite reunification. Families should be briefed about the status of their family crewmember in a culturally appropriate manner. Families and crewmembers should be equipped with a list of symptoms (see Appendix A) to watch for in the seafarer. They should also be provided with the contact information for professionals available to provide treatment for any symptoms that might occur.
6. WHEN THE CREW IS TO RETURN TO DUTY

6.1 SYMPTOM PRESENTATION TIMELINE Symptoms do not always occur immediately after a traumatic event. Post-traumatic and other emotional symptoms can present themselves when an individual returns to a setting similar to the original incident. Seafarers should be trained to recognize warning signs of symptoms and should be furnished with the contact information of professionals who could be contacted privately if needed while at sea or expected ports of call.

6.2 FOLLOW-UP ASSESSMENTS Physical and psychological assessments should be conducted three months after release from captivity. If the seafarer has returned to sea during this time, the assessment should be conducted as soon as practicable at a port of call or immediately following the end of the contract. Both crewmembers and insurers benefit from engaging trained, licensed mental health professionals to conduct assessments. In regions where these clinicians are not available, evaluations can be conducted via phone or Internet (Several assessments have online forms that have been translated into many languages.)

CONCLUDING REMARKS

As our research continues, the Center for Seafarers’ Rights at SCI will update guidelines where appropriate. If you have any questions or desire consultation, refer to the contact information below.

CONTACT INFORMATION

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APPENDIX A - SYMPTOMS TO WATCH

The following, non-exhaustive list of symptoms could suggest the presence of psychological distress. After release from captivity and prior to returning home, seafarers and their families, should be furnished with this list and instructions to connect with local healthcare professionals should any of the following present and persist [from Derogatis, 1993]:

1. NERVOUSNESS OR SHAKINESS INSIDE
2. FAINTNESS OR DIZZINESS
3. THE IDEA THAT SOMEONE ELSE CAN CONTROL YOUR THOUGHTS
4. FEELING OTHERS ARE TO BLAME FOR MOST OF YOUR TROUBLES
5. TROUBLE REMEMBERING THINGS
6. FEELING EASILY ANNOYED OR IRRITATED
7. PAINS IN HEART OR CHEST
8. FEELING AFRAID IN OPEN SPACES
9. THOUGHTS OF ENDING YOUR LIFE
10. FEELING THAT MOST PEOPLE CANNOT BE TRUSTED
11. POOR APPETITE
12. SUDDENLY SCARED FOR NO REASON
13. TEMPER OUTBURSTS THAT YOU COULD NOT CONTROL
14. FEELING LONELY EVEN WHEN YOU ARE WITH PEOPLE
15. FEELING BLOCKED IN GETTING THINGS DONE
16. FEELING LONELY
17. FEELING BLUE
18. FEELING NO INTEREST IN THINGS
19. FEELING FEARFUL
20. YOUR FEELINGS BEING EASILY HURT
21. FEELING THAT PEOPLE ARE UNFRIENDLY OR DISLIKE YOU
22. FEELING INFERIOR TO OTHERS
23. NAUSEA OR UPSET STOMACH
24. FEELING THAT YOU ARE WATCHED OR TALKED ABOUT BY OTHERS
25. TROUBLE FALLING ASLEEP
26. HAVING TO CHECK AND DOUBLE CHECK WHAT YOU DO
27. DIFFICULTY IN MAKING DECISIONS
28. FEELING AFRAID TO TRAVEL ON BUSES, SUBWAYS, OR TRAINS
29. TROUBLE GETTING YOUR BREATH
30. HOT OR COLD SPELLS
31. HAVING TO AVOID CERTAIN THINGS, PLACES, OR ACTIVITIES BECAUSE THEY FRIGHTEN YOU
32. YOUR MIND GOING BLANK
33. NUMBNESS OR TINGLING IN PARTS OF YOUR BODY
34. THE IDEA THAT YOU SHOULD BE PUNISHED FOR YOUR SINS
35. FEELING HOPELESS ABOUT THE FUTURE
36. TROUBLE CONCENTRATING
37. FEELING WEAK IN PARTS OF YOUR BODY
38. FEELING TENSE OR KEYED UP
39. THOUGHTS OF DEATH OR DYING
40. HAVING URGES TO BEAT, INJURE, OR HARM SOMEONE
41. HAVING URGES TO BREAK OR SMASH THINGS
42. FEELING VERY SELF-CONSCIOUS WITH OTHERS
43. FEELING UNEASY IN CROWDS
44. NEVER FEELING CLOSE TO ANOTHER PERSON
45. SPELLS OF TERROR OR PANIC
46. GETTING INTO FREQUENT ARGUMENTS
47. FEELING NERVOUS WHEN YOU ARE LEFT ALONE
48. FEELING OTHERS NOT GIVING YOU PROPER CREDIT FOR YOUR ACHIEVEMENTS
49. FEELING SO RESTLESS YOU COULD NOT SIT STILL
50. FEELINGS OF WORTHLESSNESS
51. FEELING THAT PEOPLE WILL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOU IF YOU LET THEM
52. FEELINGS OF GUILT
53. THE IDEA THAT SOMETHING IS WRONG WITH YOUR MIND

CONTACT INFORMATION

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APPENDIX VI

DECLARATION CONDEMNING ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST SEAFARERS

The flag states of Republic of Liberia, Republic of the Marshall Islands and Republic of Panama have signed a declaration condemning acts of violence against seafarers on 3 August 2011. The declaration recognises that the increased use of violence against ships crews during acts of piracy and armed robbery is largely underreported and that this information would be of value to the maritime community in the fight against piracy. The flag states also note that the International Maritime Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce (IMB) has undertaken to collect this information and affirms that the information collected by themselves or the IMB will be appropriately shared and that no reference to crew names or vessels will be made.

It is recognised that there are a number of questions required to be answered. However most of these questions require a simple Yes or No answer and there are only a few which may require more detail.
To this end we request you to please answer ALL the below questions in FULL and return via email to Mr. Cyrus Mody (Senior Manager IMB) email: cmody@icc-ccs.org

Vessel Name: ___________________________ Type of vessel: ___________________________
Date of hijack: ___________________________ Date of release: ___________________________

Please note no names or identifications of crew or vessel will be revealed at any time.
While answering the questions please give rank and nationality of the crew involved as well as the length of time and number of times the abuse was carried out.
Please provide and photographs taken before, during or after the incident.
Finally if you feel there is additional information available please share as this will help raise awareness among fellow seafarers.

SECTION 1

A. Crew and Nationalities:
   A.1. what were the number and nationalities of the crew onboard your vessel at the time of the hijacking
   A.2. were any of the crew females, what rank
   A.3. were there any supernumeries (wives / children) on board – if yes what was the treatment
   A.4. were different nationalities of the crew treated differently – if yes please explain the difference
   A.5. were different crew of different religions treated differently – if yes please explain the difference
   A.6. were there any security teams onboard – if yes please specify if armed or unarmed
   A.7. were these teams treated differently to the crew – if yes please explain the difference

B. Food and Water:
   B.1. was the crew given adequate food and water during captivity
   B.2. was the food for the crew prepared by the ship cook in the ship galley using ship stores
   B.3. what was the hygiene in the galley, did pirates allow the galley and utensils to be cleaned
   B.4. was fresh water or salt water used to clean galley and utensils
   B.5. where was the crew made to eat meals
   B.6. did the pirates eat the same food as the crew
   B.7. were meal times fixed - if yes please give times - if no please state frequency of meals
   B.8. did this frequency become less as the length of the negotiations increased
   B.9. were the food stores and freshwater onboard sufficient for the duration of negotiations
   B.10. if not please indicate what type of food including quality and quantity was supplied to the crew
   B.11. did the quality and the quantity of food supplied decrease as the length of negotiations increased
   B.12. if yes please indicate after how long in the negotiations was this supply decreased
   B.13. was crew kept without food and water – please specify number of days and which crew
SECTION 2
C. Physical / psychological abuse of crew by the pirates
   C.1. General
      C.1.1. was the crew physically abused  or psychologically abused  
      C.1.2. which crew (rank) were physically / psychologically abused 
      C.1.3. how often was this done 
   C.2. Physical abuse - slapping / punching / kicking
      C.2.1. was the crew slapped / punched / kicked 
      C.2.2. which crew (rank) were slapped / punched / kicked 
      C.2.3. how often was this done 
      C.2.4. why and when was this done 
      C.2.5. was crew injured because of being slapped / punched / kicked. please specify type of injury 
   C.3. Physical abuse - use of sticks, rods, wires, rifle butts, any other items (please specify)
      C.3.1. was the crew threatened by any of above 
      C.3.2. was the crew hit with any of above 
      C.3.3. which crew (rank) were hit with sticks, rods, wires, any other items 
      C.3.4. how often was this done 
      C.3.5. why and when was this done 
      C.3.6. was crew injured because of being hit by above items. please specify type of injury 
   C.4. Physical abuse - extreme violence to crew
      (Torture – is defined by the International Criminal Court as “the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused”)
      Did the pirates use any extreme physical abuse on the crew e.g.
      C.4.1. tying hands and legs and putting in isolation – please specify length of time 
      C.4.2. standing / sitting in the sun with clothes  or without clothes 
      C.4.3. if yes please specify crew involved for how long and how many times was this done 
      C.4.4. standing / sitting in the freezer with clothes  or without clothes 
      C.4.5. if yes please specify crew involved for how long and how many times was this done 
      C.4.6. tying to ship masts or ship rails and hit  or not hit 
      C.4.7. if hit please specify crew involved, what was used to hit, for how long and how many times 
      C.4.8. hung overboard and immersed in the sea 
      C.4.9. please specify which part of body immersed, how long, how many times and crew involved 
      C.4.10. electric shock given to any part of the body – please specify crew involved 
      C.4.11. which part of the body was the electric shock was given, for how long and how often 
      C.4.12. any part of the body tied to give extreme pain – please give details 
      C.4.13. any other violence or torture not included above – please specify 
   C.5. Death or injury resulting in death of crew during the incident – if yes please give rank and nationality
      C.5.1. was any crew killed or injured who later died during the hijack process either by direct or indirect firing by pirates or naval forces or security teams – please give details 
      C.5.2. did any crew die during the period of captivity – if so how and why - 
      C.5.3. did any crew die because of maltreatment / poor health during captivity 
      C.5.4. did any crew die after being released but because of maltreatment / poor health as a result of the captivity / attack 
      C.5.5. any other reasons not covered above
C.6. Psychological abuse – if yes please specify rank and nationality of crew involved
   C.6.1. was crew made to kneel and guns fired near their heads like execution
   C.6.2. when was this done
   C.6.3. how often was this done
   C.6.4. was crew taken away (isolated) and the rest of the crew informed that he was killed
   C.6.5. was crew stripped of all clothes in front of the remaining crew and hit [ ] not hit [ ]
   C.6.6. if any psychological abuse done on one crew were the remaining crew made to watch
   C.6.7. was crew made to change rank and responsibility e.g. cadet to Master - please specify
   C.6.8. was any crew taken ashore or to another ship during the negotiations
   C.6.9. if yes please give details
   C.6.10. did the pirates tell the crew that they were still hostage because their office and their family
did not care for them and did not want them released
   C.6.11. any other reasons not covered above

D. Increase / decrease in the physical / psychological abuse to the crew
   Reference to points "C" above on physical / psychological abuse to the crew
   D.1. What factors caused an increase in the physical / psychological abuse to the crew
      D.1.1. was it when there was slow or no progress in negotiations
      D.1.2. was it if some crew disobeyed pirate commands - please specify
      D.1.3. was it if crew fought among themselves or had disagreements
      D.1.4. were the crew who disobeyed only abused / punished or was it other crew as well
      D.1.5. was it when stores and freshwater onboard reduced and the pirates had to re-supply
      D.1.6. was it when FO & DO decreased (what level)
      D.1.7. was it when negotiators came onboard to call the owners
      D.1.8. was it during the changeover of the pirate watches
      D.1.9. was it when another vessel was released
      D.1.10. was it more during the day or during the night
      D.1.11. was it when pirates were arrested by navies after attacking same nationality as crew
      D.1.12. any other factors / reasons not covered above

   D.2. What factors caused a decrease in the physical violence to the crew
      D.2.1. was it when negotiations progress was good
      D.2.2. was it once crew started obeying
      D.2.3. were any concessions / preference in treatment given to the crew who obeyed – please specify
      D.2.4. any other factors not covered above

E. Isolation of crew
   E.1. was any crew isolated from the rest of the crew
   E.2. how long was this crew kept isolated
   E.3. were the rest of the crew informed about the condition of the isolated crew
   E.4. was the isolated crew given food and water and how often
   E.5. was the isolated crew slapped or hit or any other physical or psychological abuse done – please specify

F. Vessel used as mother ship
   F.1. was the vessel used as a mother ship by the Somali pirates
   F.2. was the entire crew on the vessel during the mother ship operations
   F.3. if not which crew were left behind and where were they kept
   F.4. under what conditions the crew were kept onboard the vessel during the mother ship operations
   F.5. was the crew threatened to carry out certain acts against their will - chase or board other vessels etc
   F.6. was the crew physically / psychologically abused if they refused to obey
   F.7. if yes which crew involved and what was done
   F.8. were the crew given sufficient food and water – what was frequency
   F.9. any other information
SECTION 3

G. Living and hygiene conditions
G.1. where were all the crew made to spend most of the time during the day
G.2. where were the crew allowed (forced) to sleep at night
G.3. was this place changed during the period of captivity – please specify
G.4. were the officers allowed to carry out normal bridge and engine watches
G.5. if normal watches were allowed for officers what was the rest of the crew doing
G.6. were crew allowed to walk on deck or get physical exercise or do routine ship work
G.7. what was the condition of the accommodation and cabins
G.8. did the pirates allow the crew to clean the accommodation and cabins
G.9. did pirates allow crew to wash their clothes, was fresh water or salt water used
G.10. were the crew allowed to shower
G.11. if yes how often were they allowed to shower
G.12. how much time was given to each crew
G.13. was privacy given during shower time
G.14. any other factors not covered above

H. Sanitary conditions
H.1. what was the state of the toilets and other sanitary facilities onboard the ship
H.2. were the crew allowed to use the toilets as required
H.3. if not was there a particular time that crew could use toilet only
H.4. how many times a day were the crew allowed to use the toilets
H.5. was there sufficient fresh water to clean / flush the toilets
H.6. if not was there a facility to clean / flush the toilets with salt water
H.7. were the crew forced to clean the toilets without using any water
H.8. any other factors not covered above

I. Survival techniques of crew – (please give as much detail as possible as this will help others)
I.1. what steps did each crew take to survive during the captivity
I.2. how did each crew deal with the pirates
I.3. what did each crew do to pass time
I.4. what did each crew do to keep mentally alert
I.5. what did each crew do to keep physically alert
I.6. what was the physical condition of the crew upon release
I.7. what was the mental condition of the crew upon release
I.8. did any of the crew feel sympathetic towards the Somali pirate or did the pirate ask the crew to join them
APPENDIX VII

BMP SIGNATORIES AND UPDATING BMP

1.0 BMP Signatories

1.1 In an effort to counter piracy in the Gulf of Aden (GoA) and off the Coast of Somalia, the following international industry organizations, which represent the vast majority of shipowners and operators transiting the region, are signatories to the BMP:

- Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO)
- Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)
- International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)
- International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs (IGP&I)
- International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
- International Maritime Employers’ Committee Ltd. (IMEC0
- International Association of Dry Cargo Ship Owners (INTERCARGO)
- InterManager
- International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO)
- International Shipping Federation (ISF)
- International Transport Workers Federation (ITF)
- International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA)
- Joint War Committee (JWC)
- Joint Hull Committee (JHC)
- Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF)
- Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SITTO)
- The Mission to Seafarers
- The World Shipping Council (WSC)

1.2 The BMP are supported by the following naval/military Force/Law Enforcement Organizations:

- Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)
- EU NAVFOR (The European Union Naval Force)
- INTERPOL
- Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO)
- Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA)
- Operation Ocean Shield
- NATO Shipping Center (NSC)
- UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)
- United Nations Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (UNCGPCS)
- Signatories to the New York Declaration

2.0 Updating BMP

2.1 It is anticipated that the BMP will be periodically updated based upon operational experience and lessons learned. This Notice incorporates revisions made in the 4th edition of the BMP.
2.2 BMP should be read with reference to the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) website (www.mschoa.org), “Advice to Masters” section where additional relevant information (e.g., counter-piracy information, including areas of High Risk, coordinates of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor and transit speed for GoA GT) will always be posted and available for unrestricted download (PDF format).

2.3 The BMP Guidelines also can be found on the “Piracy Alert” section of www.icc-ccs.org and on the “Home Page” of www.marisec.org.

2.4 The website www.noonsite.com/General/Piracy is another good source of counter-piracy information.
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7.0 Ship Protective Measures

7.1 General

7.2 Watchkeeping and Enhanced Vigilance

7.3 Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

7.4 Maneuvering

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7.6 Upper Deck Lighting

7.7 Deny Use of Ship’s Tools and Equipment

7.8 Protection of Equipment Stored on the Upper Deck

7.9 Control of Access to Bridge, Accommodation and Machinery Spaces

7.10 Enhanced Bridge Protection

7.11 Physical Barriers

7.12 Water Spray and Foam Monitors

7.13 Safe Muster Point

7.14 Citadel Guidelines

7.15 Crew Training and Drills

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